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DIGITAL HANDSHAKES IN CYBERSPACE UNDER E-
SIGN: "THERE'S A NEW SHERIFF IN TOWN!"
Michael H. Dessent*
"A hacker today is sort of like the guy who goes around rattling
all the windows and doors in a neighborhood, and there is a pretty
good chance he will find one open."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Without doubt, electronic commerce has increased the effi-
ciency of businesses and consumers seeking to purchase goods,
services, or intangibles by placing these objects just a keystroke
away.2 If you already enjoy buying lingerie and foie gras over the
Internet, you will love the new Electronic Signatures in Global
and National Commerce Act ("E-SIGN")' Want to borrow $10,000
* Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, California Western School of Law. B.S.,
1964, Northwestern University-, J.D., 1967, Northwestern University School of Law, cum
laude. The author wishes to thank Jacob Sharrad and Mary-Ellen Norvell for their out-
standing work on this project.
1. Lizette Alvarez & Jeri Clausing, Senate Approves Bill That Allows Online Con-
tacts, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2000, at Al (quoting Senator Ronald Wyden of Oregon, sponsor
of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act ("E-SIGN")). In today's
booming e-commerce market, a hacker's diligence stands to be handsomely rewarded.
Businesses that wish to compete via the Internet face many difficult problems. They must
not only protect their customers from hackers, but must do so in such a way as to protect
themselves contractually and otherwise from dishonest consumers.
2. See generally eMarketer: The World's Leading Provider of eBusiness statistics, at
http://vww.emarketer.com (last modified Oct. 22, 2001) (providing detailed reports, statis-
tics, newsletters, and other data regarding commerce through the Internet). From Decem-
ber 1998 to December 1999, the number of online buyers doubled to 36.1 million. Id. In the
United States alone, consumer online shopping revenues are expected to rise from $4.5
billion in 1998 to $35.3 billion by 2002, reflecting the incredible growth and speed with
which personal computers and Internet technology have increased electronic commerce
over the past few years. Id. However, with the explosion of electronic commerce comes the
need to define, create, or eliminate laws that will affect the enforceability of these cyber-
space contracts.
3. Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (2000) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7006,
7021, 7031 (2000)).
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at four in the morning over the Internet to buy a car? E-SIGN al-
lows it. Or how about entering a "cybersigning chat room," ex-
tending a "digital handshake," and then buying that cherished
wedding gown? E-SIGN allows this to happen. In this era of ever-
prevalent e-commerce, juxtaposed with increasingly effective
computer hacker schemes, lawyers will now be asked to represent
those transacting business under the new E-SIGN.4 Are you
ready for it?
It was, of course, Samuel Williston and Arthur Corbin who told
us that the concepts of offer,5 acceptance,6 and consideration7 are
the three basic essentials to the formation of a binding contract.8
In the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), Karl Llewellyn and
Soia Mentschikoff liberally interpreted the contract formation
process for the sale of goods.9 Further, modern technology has
and continues to redefine the way business transactions take
place. With computers, the Internet, and credit cards in the mix,
the steps necessary to form a binding contract in an evolving
4. See, e.g., Kate Marquess, Sign on the Dot-com Line, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2000, at 74
(discussing the facilitation of commerce over the Internet); Alvarez & Clausing, supra note
1 (discussing ways to protect consumers from hackers); Mark Ballard, E-SIGN a Nudge,
Not Revolution, NATL L.J., Sept. 25, 2000, at B1, (discussing the effect of E-SIGN on the
business community).
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT] ("An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so
made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is in-
vited and will conclude it."); see also 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS § 3.3 (1990) (introducing offer and acceptance).
6. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, §§ 52-54, 56, 58, 59, 60-63, 69 (discussing the
concept of acceptance within contracts); see also 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 3.3 (intro-
ducing offer and acceptance).
7. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 71.
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be
bargained for. (2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is
sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the pro-
misee in exchange for that promise. (3) The performance may consist of(a) an
act other than a promise, or (b) a forbearance, or (c) the creation, modifica-
tion, or destruction of a legal relation. (4) The performance or return promise
may be given to the promisor or to some other person. It may be given by the
promisee or by some other person.
Id.; see also 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 2.2 (discussing consideration as a bargained-
for exchange).
8. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 1.8 (discussing the sources of modern contract
law).
9. See id. § 1.9 (discussing the development and impact of the UCC on contract law);
see generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, SELECTIONS FOR CONTRACTS
(1998).
CYBERSPACE UNDER E-SIGN
business landscape via non-traditional mediums may no longer be
clear.
In recent years, society has seen a technological revolution
with the development of the Internet, which not only expanded
and changed the way people communicate globally, but has trans-
formed the face of business transactions. Negotiations are no
longer conducted solely through written or oral communica-
tion-they now take place electronically via the World Wide
Web.10
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW BEFORE OCTOBER 1, 2000
A. Statute of Frauds and Internet Transactions
The Statute of Frauds" has long regulated contracts by requir-
ing "writings" and "signing" 2 to indicate the parties' "inten-
tions."3 Seventeenth Century English courts required sufficient
evidence to substantiate a contractual claim in order to prevent
the possibility of fraud or perjury. 4 As such, contracts requiring
more than one year to perform-or involving the sale of real
property, the sale of securities, the answering for another's debts,
the sale of personal property, or the sale of goods over five hun-
dred dollars-are all required to be in writing to be enforceable. 5
Internet transactions involving the sale of goods over five hun-
dred dollars were in jeopardy of violating the Statute of Frauds
because of the paperless nature of the transaction. 6 In addition,
even if a paper printout of the electronic message was produced,
the signature requirement under the Statute of Frauds would
remain unsatisfied.
10. See sources cited supra note 4.
11. See e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201 (1978).
12. "Sign" means "[t]o identify (a record) by means of a signature, mark, or other sym-
bol vith the intent to authenticate it as an act or agreement of the person identifying it."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1386 (7th ed. 1999).
13. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1978).
14. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 6.1 (discussing the history and function of the
Statute of Frauds).
15. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1978).
16. See id.
17. See id.
2002]
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The Statute of Frauds issue is the initial focus of E-SIGN."8 E-
SIGN essentially says that a transaction will not be in violation of
the Statute of Frauds simply because it is memorialized in a digi-
tal form and authenticated with a digital signature.' 9 E-SIGN is
enabling legislation-it does not provide structure so much as it
provides permission.2 ° Many commentators have heralded E-
SIGN as the foundation that will allow e-contracts to flourish,
however only time will tell.2 '
B. State Responses to Difficulties with E-Commerce
Beginning in the 1990s, the American Law Institute ("ALI"), in
conjunction with the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"), sought to facilitate the use of
electronic commerce through a series of attempted uniform legis-
lation.22 Efforts were made to amend the UCC directly, particu-
larly Article 2. A whole new vocabulary was created, whereby
documents were "authenticated,"23 not just "signed,"24 and a "re-
cord"25 was created, not just a "writing."26 Words such as "com-
puter,"27 "computer information"2" and "copy" '29 were defined.
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a) (2000) (stating a general rule of validity with regard to the
use of electronic signatures in commerce).
19. See id.
20. See supra notes 2, 4, and accompanying text.
21. See supra notes 2, 4, and accompanying text.
22. See Carol A. Kunze, Who Wrote UCITA?, UCITA Online, at http'//www.ucitaon
line.com/slhpwri.html (last updated May 21, 2000).
23. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS AcT ("U.C.I.T.A.") § 102(a)(6) (2001) ("[T]o
sign; or with the intent to sign a record, otherwise to execute or adopt an electronic sym-
bol, sound, message, or process referring to, attached to, included in, or logically associated
or linked with that record.").
UCITA will be referenced numerous times throughout this article. Its complete text
can be found at the official Web site of NCCUSL's Uniform Law Commissioners which is
run in association with the University of Pennsylvania Law School. The site is located at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulcframe.htm (last updated Jan. 11, 2002).
24. See supra note 12.
25. See U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(55) (2001) ("[Ilnformation that is inscribed on a tangible
medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in a perceiv-
able form.").
26. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1978) (using writing as a requirement for meeting the Statute
of Frauds).
27. See U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(9) (2001) ("[Aln electronic device that accepts information
in digital or similar form and manipulates it for a result based on a sequence of instruc-
tions.").
28. See id. § 102(a)(10) ("[TInformation in electronic form which is obtained from or
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"Electronic agents" ° and "electronic messages"3 were also de-
fined. The basic goal was that no agreement could be struck down
simply because it was conducted through electronic means. One
of the most unique definitions is as follows:
[a] contract or other record relating to a transaction in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce may not be denied legal effect...
solely because its... creation... involved the action of one or more
electronic agents so long as the action of any such electronic agent is
legally attributable to the person to be bound.
32
At the same time E-SIGN was being developed, NCCUSL was
working on a new Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
("UETA"). 33 UETA was yet another attempt by NCCUSL to pro-
vide the electronic commerce world with some level of uniformity
on a national level.3 4 Eventually, this reform effort lost the sup-
port of the ALI. NCCUSL decided to retitle the amendment the
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA") and
seek adoption through each state legislature.
Inconsistencies and political disagreements damaged the effec-
tiveness of both UETA and UCITA at the state level.36 Finally, in
through the use of a computer or which is in a form capable of being processed by a com-
puter. The term includes a copy of the information and any documentation or packaging
associated with the copy.").
29. See id. § 102(a)(20) (T]he medium on which information is fixed on a temporary
or permanent basis and from which it can be perceived, reproduced, used, or communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.").
30. See id. § 102(a)(27) ("[A] computer program, or electronic or other automated
means, used independently to initiate an action, or to respond to electronic messages or
performances, on the person's behalf without review or action by an individual at the time
of the action or response to the message or performance."); see also Margaret Jane Radin,
Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125 (2000).
31. See U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(27) (2001) ("[A] record or display that is stored, generated
or transmitted by electronic means for the purpose of communication to another person or
electronic agent.").
32. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(h) (2000).
33. UNiT. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT ("U.E.T.A.") § 5b (Dec. 13, 1999 Draft). Like
UCITA, UETA may be found at the official Web site of NCCUSL's Uniform Law Commis-
sioners. The site is located at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm (last up-
dated Jan. 11, 2002); see discussion infra Part IV.C.
34. See Carol A. Kunze, The ETA Forum, at httpv/www.webcom.com/legaled/ETA
Forumbkgd.html (last updated July 11, 1999); see also discussion infra Part IV.C.
35. David G. Mayhan & Patricia A. Fennelly, The Uniform Computer Information Act:
Ready or Not, Here it Comes, COLO. LAW., Dec. 28, 1999, at 63.
36. See discussion infra Parts IV.B, C; see also Maureen A. O'Rourke, Progressing To-
wards a Uniform Commercial Code for Electronic Commerce or Racing Towards Nonuni-
formity?, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 635, 649-51 (1999).
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June 2000, Congress and the President created E-SIGN. While
the passage of the federal E-SIGN law does not supersede all
state efforts to govern the area, it does preempt some of the ear-
lier solutions proposed for the e-commerce puzzle." E-SIGN spe-
cifically references UETA, ensuring UETA's existence in some
form at least temporarily. UCITA's continued survival, however,
remains a mystery as there has never been a federal contract law
for normal commercial transactions. Now with the enactment of
E-SIGN, there is one.
C. Historic Evolution of the UCC and the E-Commerce
Stumbling Blocks
While E-SIGN may resolve some of the concerns regarding
Internet transactions and the Statute of Frauds, it does not ad-
dress other problem areas such as "shrink-wrap" licensing/con-
tracting and intellectual property rights. 9
When a buyer purchases a new product, there are certain war-
ranties included. These warranties are generally laid out in the
UCC.4 ° With computer software and electronic purchases, there
are three basic warranties involved.41 Express warranties involve
a specific promise given to the buyer by the distributor. 2 Also,
there are two kinds of implied warranties-warranties of fitness
and of merchantability. 3
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 7002 (2000) (specifying when E-SIGN does not preempt state law).
38. See id. § 7002(a)(1).
39. The question of federal preemption with regard to federal intellectual property
rights is beyond the scope of this article. For material that elucidates the many controver-
sies regarding intellectual property rights, see generally Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software
Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988); Storm Impact v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F.
Supp. 2d 782 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Novell v. Network Trade Ctr., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Utah
1997); Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers, 846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Holly K.
Towle, The New Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, in UNDERSTANDING THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSE, at 869, 873 (PLI Intellectual Prop. Course, Handbook
Series G-576, 1999); Cem Kaner, Software Engineering and UCITA, 18 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 435 (1999).
40. See U.C.C. §§ 2-312 to -318 (1978).
41. Micalyn S. Harris, UCITA: Helping David Face Goliath, 18 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 365, 387 (1999).
42. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314 to 315 (1978).
43. See id.; see also Michael L. Rustad, Making UCITA More Consumer-Friendly, 18 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 547 (1999); Jonathan T. Cain, Infotech and the Law:
Major Changes Proposed for Software and Data Warranties, at http://www.washington
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With the evolution of technology, variations of contract forma-
tions and contractual terms began to appear. Consider shrink-
wrap licenses. These licenses came to be known as "shrink-wrap"
because they initially were pre-printed on the outside packaging
of the software.' Once the wrapping was opened, the product was
deemed to be accepted.45 Further, shrink-wrap license contracts
often involve the payment and shipment of software, which in-
cludes a complex license agreement. However, in order to fully
comprehend the impact shrink-wrap agreements will have on
technological contracts, the law surrounding shrink-wrap licenses
must be examined.
Initially, courts found shrink-wrap licenses invalid on contract
formation grounds.46 However, courts allowed the formation of a
contract by payment and shipment of the software. Thus, confu-
sion remained as to what terms to adopt. Courts then looked to
the battle of forms section of the UCC, section 2-207, and con-
cluded that post-sale license terms were mere proposals which
the user could adopt if he so chose. Needless to say, most license
terms went unaccepted and unadopted by the end user. However,
in the wake of ProCD v. Zeidenberg,' the law began to change.49
The problems with shrink-wrap licenses were originally tackled
by the states and were supposed to be resolved, in part, by
UCITA.50 However, this act has been submitted to legislatures
throughout the United States by NCCUSL with only limited suc-
cess. Reasons for the lukewarm response to UCITA will be dis-
cussed below.5'
In addition to UCITA, in July 1999, NCCUSL proposed
UETA.52 UETA was designed to be passed by each state, in con-
technology.com/news/11.6/news/9874-1.html (June 27, 1996).
44. Batya Goodman, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap
Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319, 320 (1999).
45. Id.
46. See discussion infra Parts I.A, C, 111.I.
47. See discussion infra Part IHA.
48. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
49. See discussion infra Part ]LI.D.
50. See generally Rustad, supra note 43, at 547; Towle, supra note 39, at 869; Ray-
mond T. Nimmer, UCITA. A Commercial Contract Code, COMPUTER LAW., May 2000, at 3,
6.
51. See discussion infra Parts IV.B-C.
52. Ballard, supra note 4.
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junction with UCITA, in order to standardize various contract
laws on a national basis so that businesses could take advantage
of the Internet.53 Uniformity, however, was undermined by each
state's numerous and lengthy additions to the original law."
The UCC was drafted under the influence of a school of
thought known as legal realism.5 5 The legal realists drafted the
UCC to reflect not only the common practices of contract law
throughout the United States at the time, but to do away with
many of the old common law conventions that plagued contract
law and impeded efficient business transactions.56 The drafters
strived to make contract formation easy and not reliant on in-
flexible common law machinery. 7 For the most part, the drafters
of the UCC were successful. Adoption of the UCC by the states
has been almost universal, which explains why the drafters origi-
nally conceived UCITA as an amendment to the UCC.51
Yet, two common law doctrines invariably rear their ugly heads
in the discussion of e-commerce and contracts. The drafters of the
UCC targeted these rules because they pinpointed what the
drafters wished to abolish. First, the "mirror image" rule required
the documents exchanged by the parties to have exactly the same
terms in order to form a contract.59 Second, the "last shot" rule
held that the terms sent last were the terms that were binding on
both parties if the receiving party did not object and performed
anyway." UCC section 2-207 attempts to excise these common
53. Ballard, supra note 4; see also Adam White Scoville, Clear Signatures, Obscure
Signs, 17 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345 (1999).
54. Ballard, supra note 4. A total of twenty-two states have passed electronic transac-
tion laws, and an additional twenty-four have addressed the problem in various other
ways. Id.
55. See generally John M. Breen, Statutory Interpretation and the Lessons of Lle-
wellyn, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 263 (2000); Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract
Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710 (1997).
56. See sources cited supra note 55.
57. See U.C.C. §§ 1-106, 2-204, 2-206, 2-209 (1978).
58. See Matthew J. Smith, An Overview of the Uniform Computer Information Trans-
actions Act: Warranties, Self-Help, and Contract Formation-Why UCITA Should Be Re-
named "The Licensors' Protection Act," 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 389, 390 (2001).
59. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONTRACTS 225-48 (5th ed. 1995).
60. Id.
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law demons from contract law, but in doing so has itself been the
subject of much criticism.6'
Section 2-207, often referred to as "the battle of the forms,"
states that
[a] definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different
from those offered or agreed upon, unless the acceptance is expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
6 2
With regard to consumers, any additional terms will be consid-
ered proposals for additions to the contract.63 Between merchants,
the additional or different terms become part of the contract
"unless the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the
offer, they materially alter [the contract], or notification of objec-
tion to [the additional terms]" is given.' The final part of section
2-207 provides that "[clonduct by both parties which recognizes
the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for
sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise estab-
lish a contract."65 The terms of a contract formed by performance
will be those on which both parties agree and those provided by
the standard UCC "gap-fillers."66
This section of the UCC has prompted efforts at revision be-
cause of the promulgation of electronic contracts, shrink-wrap li-
censes, and click-wrap licenses.61 The function of these licenses
and contracts is to "disclaim warranties, limit liability for the
breach of warranties, and to prohibit or limit the copying and use
of material protected under the Copyright Act."6' These licenses
and contracts are placed on software packaging and are encoded
as part of the set-up of computer programs.69 When a consumer
opens the packaging or clicks on the "accept" button referencing
61. See id.
62. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1978).
63. Id. § 2-207(2).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 2-207(3).
66. Id.
67. See Garry L. Founds, Shrink-wrap and Clickwrap Agreements: 2B or Not 2B, 52
FED. COMM. L.J. 99, 121 (1999).
68. Id.
69. Id.
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the contract agreement, the user is agreeing to be bound by the
terms included, even though a contract was never signed.7 °
Contracts such as these are an important part of today's busi-
ness environment because of the amount of software purchased
on the Internet or by phone. The licenses provide for the inventor
of the program to legally bind those people downloading the pro-
gram and those who receive it in the mail, without the use of a
hard copy of the contract prior to or at the time of sale.7 Hypo-
thetically, if users do not select the "accept" button, thus binding
them to the contract, or if they choose not to agree to the terms of
a license included in the packaging of the product, they are not
able to proceed and therefore do not have use of the program.
Unfortunately, enforceability of these licenses is not as simple
as pressing a button. Inventors and companies distributing soft-
ware over the Internet and by phone must take steps to ensure
that a valid contract is conveyed to the purchasing party. More
precisely, the distributor must make the purchaser "aware of...
the terms of the license agreement together with price, quantity,
and goods" in order to make the shrink-wrap license enforceable
under current law in most jurisdictions.72
Distributors have a number of options for protecting both
themselves and inventors. For instance, distributors could re-
quire the signing of a contract upon delivery, but this could in-
crease costs.73 A cheaper alternative is to have the purchaser
press an "accept" button at the start of installation, but this
might not be legally binding.74 In addition, in a click-wrap agree-
ment scenario, the licensor must also provide an escape route for
those people who choose not to comply.75 Hypothetically, when
various conditions are met, a shrink-wrap license is legitimate
and can be enforced as a valid contract.
70. Assoc. of Research Libraries, New Article of UCC Addresses Licenses, at
http://www.arl.org/newsltr/190/ucc.html (last modified Mar. 27, 1997).
71. Jon Roberts, Internet and Licensing Issues--Do You Really Have a Deal?, avail-
able at http://www.ttechnology.com/articles/1998/nov.98//internet-licensing.html (Nov.
1998).
72. Id.; see also Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 101-02 (3d Cir.
1991).
73. See Roberts, supra note 71.
74. See id.
75. See id.
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The general terms of a shrink-wrap or click-wrap license are
that it: "(1) prohibits making unauthorized copies of the software,
(2) prohibits rental of the software, (3) prohibits reverse engineer-
ing and modifications to the software, (4) limits use of the soft-
ware to one central processing unit, (5) disclaims warranties, and
(6) and limits liability."76 According to some authorities, all of
these terms must appear on the outside of the package to be en-
forceable.77 If the terms are not clearly visible to the purchaser,
the contract as proposed by the distributor may not be enforced."
If this happens, the contract may be established by what the pur-
chaser knew it to be at the time of purchase.79 In this case, a court
would interpret what those terms are by noting what was visible
on the package (i.e., the price, what was purchased, and the
number that were purchased) and what was known by the pur-
chaser, with the rest of the terms being filled in by the UCC.8 °
The issue of enforceability of the shrink-wrap and click-wrap
licenses is being debated because, among other things, there is no
opportunity for the purchaser to negotiate the agreement and the
terms are extremely broad and highly restrictive.8 ' Also, when
there is no signature by the party against whom the contract is
being enforced, it can be argued that the contract is one of adhe-
sion.82 The contract could be something purchasers did not agree
to and perhaps did not know about until after the sale, making it
arguably unconscionable and unenforceable. Interestingly, sev-
eral federal courts have introduced a new element into the equa-
tion. Courts are now questioning whether section 2-207 requires
two merchants to be involved. If it does, then a sale by a mer-
76. Lloyd L. Rich, If You Use a Shrinkwrap License, It May Not Be Enforceable: Mass
Market Software & The Shrinkwrap License, at httpJ/vww.islandnet.com/-wwlia/us-
softl.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2002).
77. See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 651 (W.D. Wisc. 1996), rev'd, 86 F.3d
1447 (7th Cir. 1996), discussed infra at Part 1II.D.; see also Goodman, supra note 44.
78. ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 651.
79. Compare Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 104-05 (3d Cir. 1991),
with Arizona Retail Sys. v. Soft are Link, 831 F. Supp. 759, 765 (D. Ariz. 1993) (discuss-
ing the different treatment of terms made known to the parties before the contract was
formed and those added after the contract was formed).
80. Michael J. Dunne & Elizabeth A. Barba, Enforceability of Shrink-Wrap Licenses,
NEW JERSEY LAW., Sept. 1996, at 18.
81. Founds, supra note 67, at 103.
82. See Rich, supra note 76.
83. See Dunne & Barba, supra note 80.
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chant to an individual consumer may be covered by yet another
section-UCC section 2-204.'
III. THE KEY CASES
A brief history of the key cases regarding shrink-wrap licensing
and their application of the UCC will provide insight into why
state legislatures began to propose legislative remedies, and how
those remedies might affect contract law in the early Twenty-first
Century. The dialogue regarding the appropriateness of "box-top
licenses"--later redubbed "shrink-wrap licenses" 5 and analogized
to "click-wrap agreements" 86-and the applicability of UCC sec-
tion 2-207 essentially began in 1991 in Step-Saver Data Systems
v. Wyse Technology. 7 That dialogue continued throughout the
1990s, with each case helping to define the relationship between
traditional contract theory and technology. 8 Klocek v. Gateway,
Inc. 9 is the most recent opinion added to the dialogue and comes
84. See discussion infra Part III.D.
85. A "shrink-wrap license" involves
[a] printed license that is displayed on the outside of a software package and
that advises the buyer that by opening the package, the buyer becomes le-
gally obligated to abide by the terms of the license. Shrink-wrap licenses
usually seek to (1) prohibit users from making unauthorized copies of the
software, (2) prohibit modifications to the software, (3) limit use of the soft-
ware to one computer, (4) limit the manufacturer's liability, and (5) disclaim
warranties. - Also written shrinkwrap license. - Also termed box-top li-
cense; tear-me-open license.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 931 (7th ed. 1999).
86. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 593
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
87. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
88. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding
that terms sent in a computer box, which stated that they governed the sale unless the
computer was returned within thirty days, were binding on the buyer who did not return
the computer); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
a shrinkwrap license included with software was binding on the buyer under the UCC);
Arizona Retail Sys. v. Software Link, 831 F. Supp. 759, 763 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding that a
contract was formed when the buyer opened the shrinkwrap on the software, where a li-
cense agreement appeared on the shrinkwrap); Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp., No. C.A. 98C-09-
064RRC, 1999 WL 1442014, at *1 (Del. Super. Sept. 3, 1999) (finding that a seller's dis-
claimer of the implied warranty of merchantability for a computer "Zip drive" was suffi-
ciently "conspicuous" as required by the UCC when contained in the packaging of the
product); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); M.A. Morten-
son Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000).
89. 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000).
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nipping at the heels of E-SIGN. Despite this, the question re-
mains: did these cases present problems that the UCC and tradi-
tional contract devices could not adequately resolve, and do E-
SIGN, UETA, and UCITA provide for better remedies?
A. Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology
Step-Saver essentially began the federal discussion regarding
the enforceability and applicability of shrink-wrap licenses."0
Step-Saver evaluated the needs of particular computer users,
compared those needs with available technology, and designed
hardware and software packages to accommodate those needs. 9'
In 1985, Step-Saver became aware of a company named The
Software Link, Inc. ("TSL") that was producing a program Step-
Saver felt would be beneficial to its clientele and would interface
with the other hardware and software Step-Saver was market-
ing.92 After Step-Saver conducted some preliminary testing, it de-
cided to market a hardware and software package featuring
TSL's own program called "Multilink."93
Between August 1986 and March 1987, Step-Saver "purchased
and resold 142 copies of the Multilink Advanced Program."
94
Typically, Step-Saver would telephone TSL and place an order for
twenty copies of Multilink at a time.95 TSL would accept the order
and promise to ship the goods promptly.96 No reference was made
during the phone calls regarding a disclaimer of any warranties. 97
"After the telephone order, Step-Saver would send a purchase or-
der, detailing the items to be purchased, their price, shipping and
payment terms."' TSL's shipment to Step-Saver included an in-
voice, and the terms contained in the enclosed invoice mirrored
those in the Step-Saver purchase order.99 Neither the purchase
90. See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 98-107.
91. Id. at 93.
92. Id. at 95.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 95-96.
96. Id. at 96.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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orders nor the invoices referenced a disclaimer of warranty.'
Printed on the packaging of each copy of Multilink, however, was
a copy of a shrink-wrap license that contained various critical
terms.''
Those terms disclaimed all express and implied warranties' 2
and limited the purchaser's remedies to replacement of the pro-
gram.' O3 The license also included an integration clause.' 4 The li-
cense instructed the purchaser that opening the packaging bound
the purchaser to the terms included in the shrink-wrap license,
and if this was not acceptable to return the unopened program to
the seller within fifteen days.0 5
Significant performance problems arose and the enforceability
of the shrink-wrap license came into question when Multilink's
performance was allegedly inconsistent with TSL's representa-
tions to Step-Saver.'06 Entire systems that Step-Saver had sold to
independent entities featuring Multilink were rendered useless
and Step-Saver's customers, in turn, filed suit.107 Step-Saver then
filed suit against TSL alleging breach of warranty and intentional
misrepresentation.' TSL defended the suit seeking shelter un-
der the terms of its shrink-wrap license.109
Step-Saver argued that the contract was formed on the tele-
phone when TSL agreed to ship the software at the agreed upon
price." ° This would make the shrink-wrap license a material al-
teration to the contract between the parties, and would therefore
not become part of the contract under UCC section 2-207(2)."'
TSL argued that formation did not occur until Step-Saver re-
ceived the program, was given notice of the terms, and opened the
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. However, this did not include a warranty stating that the disks contained in
the box were free from defects. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 94.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 97.
111. Id.; see supra notes 62-66.
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packaging.112 In the alternative, TSL maintained that its accep-
tance of Step-Saver's telephone offer was conditional on Step-
Saver's own acceptance of the shrink-wrap license." Under this
interpretation, TSL was making a counteroffer that Step-Saver
accepted when it opened the packaging."4 Finally, TSL argued
that regardless of how the contract was formed, Step-Saver's re-
peated orders with knowledge of the disclaimer equated to Step-
Saver's assent to the disclaimer.
1 5
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with Step-
Saver and used UCC subsections 2-207(1) and 2-207(2) in its
analysis."6 "The parties's [sic] performance demonstrates the ex-
istence of a contract. The dispute is, therefore, not over the exis-
tence of a contract, but the nature of its terms.""7 The court then
applied section 2-207 to each of TSL's arguments in turn."'
First, the court held that the contract was sufficiently definite
without reference to the shrink-wrap license, contrary to TSL's
position." 9 The court held that all the necessary terms to form a
contract were present including the identification of the goods,
the quantity, and the price. 2  Furthermore the "gaping holes"
that TSL claimed made the contract indefinite, namely the war-
ranty provisions and party rights, would be taken care of by ei-
ther copyright laws or the "gap fillers" of the UCC.121 Therefore,
reference to the shrink-wrap license was not necessary. 22
Next, the court addressed whether the shrink-wrap license was
a counteroffer. 123 The court stated that it was unsure whether a
conditional acceptance analysis applied when a contract had been
established by performance, but they made this assumption in
order to address TSL's arguments. 24 The court noted the exis-
112. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 97.
113. Id. at 97-98.
114. Id. at 98.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing McJunkin Corp. v. Mechanicals, Inc., 888 F.2d 481, 488 (6th Cir. 1989)).
118. See id. at 99-106.
119. Id. at 100.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 100-01.
124. Id. at 101. But see Arizona Retail Sys. v. Sofivare Link, 831 F. Supp. 759, 764-65
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tence of three tests to determine whether a writing constitutes a
conditional acceptance.'25 The approach the court adopted "re-
quires the offeree to demonstrate an unwillingness to proceed
with the transaction unless the additional or different terms are
included in the contract."'26 The court felt that this approach was
the most consistent with the philosophy underlying UCC section
2-207(1).127
The court found that the language provided by TSL was not
sufficient to make TSL's acknowledgement a conditional accep-
tance, thus triggering a contract under 2-207(1).2s Specifically,
the court held that the "consent by opening" language was not
sufficient to transform the acknowledgement into a conditional
acceptance. 29
The refund provision in TSL's terms made a strong case that
the acknowledgement was in fact a conditional acceptance.' 30
However, this argument was trumped by the testimony of one of
Step-Saver's employees who said that TSL had assured him that
the shrink-wrap license did not apply to Step-Saver.' 3' Addition-
ally, there was evidence that TSL had attempted to have Step-
Saver sign formal agreements that contained the warranty dis-
claimer and limited remedy terms. 32
Finally, the court addressed whether the parties' "course of
dealing" incorporated the disputed terms of the shrink-wrap li-
(D. Ariz. 1993) ("[Tlhe court does not believe that the license agreement in this case could
constitute a conditional acceptance regardless of its terms or the importance of those
terms to TSL.").
125. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 101. The first two approaches were rejected. Under the
first test, an offeree's response is a conditional acceptance to the extent it states a term
"materially altering the contratual obligations solely to the disadvantage of the offeror."
Id. (quoting Diatom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1576 (9th Cir. 1984)). A sec-
ond approach considered an acceptance conditional when certain key words or phrases are
used, such as written confirmation stating that the terms of the confirmation are "the only
one's upon which we will accept orders." Id. (quoting Ralph Shrader, Inc. v. Diamond Intl
Corp., 833 F.2d 1210, 1214 (6th Cir. 1987)).
126. Id. at 102.
127. Id.; see also supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
128. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 102.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. Of course, the question follows that if TSL believed Step-Saver was bound by
the terms contained in the shrink-wrap license, then why did it attempt to memorialize a
formal agreement with Step-Saver binding it to terms to which, under TSL's theory, Step-
Saver was already bound?
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cense into the contractual relationship between the parties.'33
TSL argued that Step-Saver's continued orders and use of the
software, with notice of the shrink-wrap license, incorporated the
terms into the contract between the parties.3
The court declined to adopt this argument on two grounds. 5
First, the repeated exchange of forms only communicated to Step-
Saver that TSL desired the disputed terms.3 6 TSL's failure to ob-
tain Step-Saver's express assent to the terms before the product
was shipped allowed Step-Saver to reasonably conclude that
while TSL might desire specific terms, it had agreed to do busi-
ness on other terms, expressly agreed upon by the parties.37 Sec-
ond, the court held that the seller often has the opportunity to
negotiate precise terms in multiple transaction agreements, just
as TSL attempted to do in this case. 3 While a seller in TSL's po-
sition would like the court to incorporate all of the seller's terms,
if the terms are not agreed upon by both parties, it would be
against contract law to do so. 39
Additionally, the court found the "course of dealing" between
TSL and Step-Saver to be contrary to the idea that TSL's terms
were incorporated into the contract.'4 ° First, TSL tried to obtain
Step-Saver's express consent to the disclaimer and limitation of
damages, however, Step-Saver refused. 4' Second, when TSL was
notified of the problems with the software by Step-Saver, TSL ex-
erted considerable time and energy in trying to rectify the prob-
lem.
Overall, the Third Circuit held, as a policy matter, that it was
better that conspicuous disclaimers be made available before the
contract is formed.' The court stated that "[w]hen a disclaimer is
not expressed until after the contract is formed, UCC section 2-
133. Id. at 102-04.
134. Id. at 103.
135. Id. at 104.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. But see Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD v. Zeidenberg,
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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207 governs the interpretation of the contract, and, between mer-
chants, such disclaimers, to the extent they materially alter the
parties's [sic] agreement, are not incorporated into the parties's
[sic] agreement."" The court used subsections 2-207(1) and 2-
207(2) to analyze this problem, and stated that if this rule was to
be changed, a legislature was the proper venue rather than the
judiciary. 145
The court's recognition of a contract upon the parties' perform-
ance of order, acceptance, and payment is a key distinction be-
tween Step-Saver and its progeny.146 The Step-Saver court, by
demarcating formation as the time the actual goods traded hands,
is then allowed to use UCC section 2-207 to analyze the prob-
lem. 47
B. C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan International Co.
The Third Circuit's reliance on subsections (1) and (2) of section
2-207 in Step-Saver can be compared to C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan
International Co.148 where the Seventh Circuit relied on subsec-
tions 2-207(1) and 2-207(3). 14 Itoh is a reprieve from the technol-
ogy-driven case law that has dominated the discussion thus far.
Itoh provides insight into the Seventh Circuit's application of sec-
tion 2-207 as opposed to the Third Circuit's understanding. 0
C. Itoh & Co. was a "middle-man" who had submitted a pur-
chase order for a stipulated quantity of steel coils to Jordan In-
ternational Company.'5 ' Itoh's purchase order with Jordan was
complemented by a contract to sell the steel coils it was purchas-
ing from Jordan to Riverview Steel Corporation.'52 After the coils
had been delivered by Jordan and paid for by Itoh, Riverview re-
fused to pay Itoh claiming that the coils were defective and did
not conform to the standards set forth in the contract between
144. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 105.
145. Id.
146. Id. But see Hill, 105 F.3d 1147.
147. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 105.
148. 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977).
149. Id. at 1238.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 1230.
152. Id.
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Riverview and Itoh.'53 Itoh brought suit against Riverview claim-
ing Riverview had wrongfully withheld payment.' Itoh also sued
Jordan claiming that Jordan had sold defective steel and made a
late delivery.'55 The Seventh Circuit was called upon to sort
through all of the different form contracts that the parties had
exchanged to determine the contractual relationships between
the parties. 56
The court began its discussion by analyzing the relationship
between Itoh and Jordan."' Itoh sent a purchase order for the
steel coils to Jordan which contained no arbitration provision. 5
In response to Itoh's purchase order, Jordan sent an acknowl-
edgment containing a broad arbitration provision on the back
page that was generally referenced by language on the front
page.- '59 After the documents were exchanged, Jordan delivered
the coils and Itoh paid for them, but at no time did Itoh expressly
assent or object to the additional arbitration term included in Jor-
dan's acknowledgment. 60
First, the court, in deciding the nature of Itoh and Jordan's re-
lationship, clarified a misperception by some of the lower New
York courts regarding the application of UCC section 2-201,
stated that section 2-207 was the applicable code section.' The
court then tracked the historical development of section 2-207
and its rejection of the common law "mirror image" rule. 62 The
court quoted UCC section 2-207(1): "[A] contract... [may be]
recognized notwithstanding the fact that an acceptance... con-
tains terms additional to... those of the offer. ..
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1232.
157. Id. at 1230.
158. Id.
159. Id. The notice stated, "[sleller's acceptance is, however, expressly conditional on
Buyer's assent to the additional or different terms and conditions set forth below and
printed on the reverse side. If these terms and conditions are not acceptable, Buyer should
notify Seller at once." Id.
160. Id.
16L Id. at 1232-33.
162. Id. at 1234-35.
163. Id. at 1235 (quoting Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d. 1161, 1166 (6th
Cir. 1972)).
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However, the court held that while section 2-207(1) was a de-
parture from the "mirror image" rule, there were exceptions to
section 2-207(1) that would prevent contract formation." Accord-
ing to the Itoh court, section 2-207(1) "contains a proviso which
operates to prevent an exchange of forms from creating a contract
where 'acceptance is expressly conditional on assent to the addi-
tional... terms."'165 Following the precedent set forth by the
Sixth Circuit in Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp.,66 the Seventh
Circuit construed the proviso narrowly, and after examining the
language of Jordan's acknowledgement, held that it fell under the
proviso.167 Therefore, the exchange of forms between Jordan and
Itoh did not result in a contract under UCC section 2-207(1) and
Jordan's acknowledgment became a counteroffer. 6 '
Since no contract existed, either party was free to walk away
from the transaction at that time, but neither party did. Subse-
quently, performance between the parties took place.'69 The court
noted that under the common law, Itoh's performance would
probably have constituted acceptance of Jordan's counteroffer and
the "last shot" rule would have applied; however, the UCC re-
quired a different analysis. 7 ° According to the court, in a situa-
tion where the parties' writings do not form a contract, but
performance takes place, section 2-207(3) operates to create a
contract based on the parties' performance.' 7' So, while a contract
did not exist under section 2-207(1), one was formed between Itoh
and Jordan under section 2-207(3) that only left ambiguity re-
garding which terms governed the contractual relationship. 172
At common law, the terms of the Jordan acknowledgment
would have become the terms of the contract between Itoh and
Jordan. 73 UCC section 2-207(3), however, states that "the terms
of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the
writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary
164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1978)).
166. 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972).
167. Itoh, 552 F.2d at 1235.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1236.
170. Id.
171. Id.; see U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (1978).
172. Itoh, 552 F.2d at 1236.
173. Id.
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terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act." 4 The
facts of the case showed that Itoh and Jordan did not agree on the
arbitration provision, so the court then had to analyze whether
the arbitration could be considered a supplementary term incor-
porated under some other provision of the UCC. 75
The court found that the "supplementary terms" contemplated
by section 2-207(3) were limited to the standardized "gap fillers"
within UCC Article 2.176 According to the Seventh Circuit, none of
the standard "gap fillers" provided for arbitration when the par-
ties were in disagreement. 7 7 Additionally, the Court felt that it
was not good policy to allow disputed terms into a contract cre-
ated by section 2-207(3) under the guise of "supplementary
terms.' 78
The Seventh Circuit's application of UCC section 2-207 is to be
distinguished from the Third Circuit's application. In Itoh, the
Seventh Circuit relied on subsections 2-207(1) and 2-207(3), while
the Third Circuit in Step-Saver, a factually analogous case, used
subsections 2-207(1) and 2-207(2). 17' The differences in each
court's application led to decisions diametrically opposed to one
another in later cases regarding shrink-wrap licenses.
C. Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link
Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link... presented a
problem very similar to the one posed in Step-Saver. In fact, TSL
was the defendant in this suit as well. Step-Saver was the pri-
mary support used by the District Court in Arizona when decid-
ing Arizona Retail Systems. The court in Arizona Retail Systems,
however, distinguished Step-Saver in some important ways and
spent more time grappling with exactly when the numerous con-
tracts were formed in order to determine the applicability of UCC
section 2-207.181
174. U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (1978).
175. Itoh, 552 F.2d at 1236-37.
176. Id. at 1237; see also U.C.C. §§ 2-308 to 2-310 (1978).
177. Itoh, 552 F.2d at 1237.
178. Id.
179. See discussion supra Parts IM.A.
180. 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993).
18L See id. at 764-66.
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Factually, Arizona Retail Systems is almost identical to Step-
Saver."8 2 Arizona Retail Systems (ARS) packaged computer sys-
tems consisting of assorted hardware and software catering to
specific computer users' needs.'83 After becoming aware of TSL's
software and doing some preliminary testing, ARS began to con-
duct business with TSL.8 TSL and ARS conducted business in
much the same manner as TSL and Step-Saver-a phone call for
an order was answered with a shipment.'85 TSL's software did not
perform as promised. 8 ' ARS's customers sued, and ARS sought
indemnification from TSL.
8 7
The Arizona Retail Systems court was much more meticulous
in its analysis than was the Step-Saver court. The court, while
recognizing the applicability of UCC section 2-207, also suggested
the applicability of UCC section 2-209 to help determine the
terms of the contract between the parties.' UCC section 2-209
allows for modification to existing contracts without considera-
tion, another major change from the common law.8 9 The court
found that the parties entered into several contracts and that the
first contract the parties formed was materially different, and
therefore, required a different analysis than the subsequent con-
tracts.' 90
The court was unclear factually with regard to what the first
interaction between ARS and TSL entailed.' 9 ' It was unable to
determine whether ARS ordered an evaluation disk from TSL, or
whether it ordered the regular software package that included
the evaluation disk.'92 Because of this ambiguity, and because the
court ultimately determined that ARS ordered an evaluation
disk, intending to test the program before putting it into produc-
182. See id. at 761; see discussion supra Part III.A_
183. Arizona Retail Sys., 831 F. Supp. at 760.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 761.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 762-63.
189. See U.C.C. § 2-209 (1978).
190. Arizona Retail Sys., 831 F. Supp. at 763.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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tion, the court analyzed the first transaction differently than the
subsequent transactions.'93
The court held that if ARS requested an evaluation disk and a
copy of the live program, and then decided to keep the live copy,
then ARS was bound by the shrink-wrap contract on the packag-
ing of the live version.'94 In this scenario, the court held that the
contract was formed when ARS opened the shrink-wrap on the
live version whereby ARS had notice that this would result in
contract formation-not when TSL shipped the test disk and live
copy.' 95 The Arizona Retail Systems court harmonize its opinion
with Step-Saver by using the following language:
The court's decision in this respect is not inconsistent with Step-
Saver. The Step-Saver court addressed the situation in which a con-
tract had been formed by the conduct of the parties-i.e., through the
ordering and shipping of the agreed-upon goods-but the goods ar-
rived with the license agreement affixed. In such cases, the contract
is formed before the purchaser becomes aware of the seller's insis-
tence on certain terms.
196
This factual nuance is key because the Arizona Retail Systems
court's treatment of the contract on the trial copy is not unlike
the judicial treatment of the Gateway cases.9 7
With regard to the subsequent contracts, TSL modified the ar-
guments it previously used against Step-Saver, but to no avail.
First, TSL argued that the shrink-wrap license was a proposed
modification to the original contract that ARS accepted by open-
ing the package, which is permissible under section 2-209.9' Al-
ternatively, TSL argued that the shrink-wrap license constituted
a conditional acceptance of ARS's offer to purchase, and ARS ac-
cepted TSL's conditional acceptance by opening the package. 99
Finally, TSL argued that if the court insisted on applying UCC
section 2-207, then the warranty terms of the shrink-wrap
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Brower v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998); see also discussion supra Parts
II.E-F.
198. Arizona Retail Sys., 831 F. Supp. at 763; see U.C.C. § 2-209 (1978).
199. Arizona Retail Sys., 831 F. Supp. at 764.
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license became part of the contract because the terms were not
material. °°
The court responded to TSL's first argument with the following
language:
To the extent that the parties had entered into an agreement before
ARS opened the shrinkwrap package, the license agreement would
constitute a proposal for modification of the agreement pursuant to
section 2-209. Section 2-209 requires assent to proposed modifica-
tions and this court, like the court in Step-Saver, concludes that the
assent must be express and cannot be inferred merely from a party's
conduct in continuing with the agreement.20 '
With regard to TSL's second argument, the court held that the
shrink-wrap license could not constitute a conditional acceptance
regardless of its terms or how important those terms were to
TSL.2 °2 The court decided, "[b]y agreeing to ship the goods to Ari-
zona Retail Systems, or, at the latest, by shipping the goods, TSL
entered into a contract with ARS."2 °3 Once TSL entered into the
contract, it had accepted ARS's offer and was not free to proffer
the shrink-wrap license as a conditional acceptance.2 4 This is be-
cause "conditional acceptances" are usually regarded as counter-
offers.20 5 A party to a contract cannot counteroffer after they have
already accepted. The shrink-wrap license was either a proposal
to modify or a material alteration, both of which required ARS's
assent to become binding under section 2-209.2o' The court, rely-
ing on Step-Saver, rejected TSL's proposition that the warranty
terms were not material.2 7
Step-Saver and Arizona Retail Systems seem to stand for the
proposition that a contract is formed when one merchant commu-
nicates with another merchant, the parties agree on a price, and
the seller ships the goods. In the event the terms are incomplete
or the parties disagree on the terms, UCC sections 2-207(1) and
(2), in addition to section 2-209, apply to fill in the proper
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 764-65; see also Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 101
(3d Cir. 1991).
203. Arizona Retail Sys., 831 F. Supp. at 765.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 765-66.
207. Id. at 766.
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terms--unless the one seeking the "last shot" uses words requir-
ing the original offeror's express assent to the new terms.208 When
ProCD v. Zeidenberg°9 was decided, however, UCC section 2-207
may have become irrelevant in certain contexts.
D. ProCD v. Zeidenberg
In ProCD v. Zeidenberg, ProCD took information from tele-
phone directories and put them on a CD-ROM disc.210 They added
more information including nine-digit zip codes and sold the
product as "SelectPhone."21" ' ProCD invested more than ten mil-
lion dollars to compile the information and to periodically update
it. 2 2 To protect their investment, ProCD enclosed a restriction li-
cense in every box containing the software.2" Additionally, ProCD
placed a warning on the CD-ROM disks so that the restriction
would appear whenever the program was used.21 4
Matthew Zeidenberg purchased the "SelectPhone" in 1994.215
While he was aware of the license, he chose to ignore it and
formed a company to resell the information that was in the "Se-
lectPhone" database.2 6 Zeidenberg also purchased additional cop-
ies of the "SelectPhone" to update the information he was resell-
ing.2 7 Each of these packages contained an identical license to
the one included in the first copy of the "SelectPhone."
21
ProCD sued Zeidenberg seeking an injunction to keep Zeiden-
berg from continuing to distribute the copied database.1 9 The dis-
trict court found the licenses to be invalid since they did not ap-
pear on the outside of the package and held that a person could
not be bound by secret terms.220 The district court looked at the
208. See discussion supra Parts III.A-B.
209. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
210. Id. at 1447.
211. Id. at 1449.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1450.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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licenses as contracts and concluded that for there to be a valid
contract there must be agreement between the parties on the
terms.22' It was Zeidenberg's position that "the printed terms on
the outside of a box are the parties' contract-except for printed
terms that refer to or incorporate other terms."222
The Seventh Circuit questioned the lower court's analysis of
the validity of the license being based on the "outside the box"
terms.223 The court pointed out that entire licenses cannot be put
onto a box-it would be so small the consumer would not be able
to read it.224 The court found that "En]otice on the outside, terms
on the inside, and a right to return the software for a refund if
the terms are unacceptable ... may be a means of doing business
valuable to buyers and sellers alike."225 Thus, the key provision
was UCC section 2-204.226 There was only one merchant, the
court said, and thus there could be no "battle of the forms" trig-
gering 2-207.227
Comparing the situation here to that of sports, airline, or con-
cert tickets, the full license is on the ticket and can be rejected or
accepted by the use or return of the ticket.228 In today's techno-
logically advanced world, there are a limited number of software
purchases that take place in a store with a box to scrutinize.229
Increasingly, purchases are being made on the Internet or over
the phone. 230 This led the court to question the effect of the cur-
rent laws on the problem.231' The court found that while the text
was not completely fitted to the issue, the effects of the law were
the same.232
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 211 cmt. a); 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note
5, § 4.26).
226. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
227. Id. at 1452. But see supra Parts III.A and III.C (discussing the interpretation of
UCC § 2-207 (1978) within Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991),
and Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993)).
228. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
229. Id. at 1451-52.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1452-54.
232. Id.
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The court found that ProCD's contract did allow for an oppor-
tunity to inspect the license that went into effect after the buyer
used the program. 3 The court stated that ProCD, under the im-
primatur of section 2-204, created a "rolling acceptance" period,
which would not allow the purchaser to proceed until reading and
agreeing to the terms of the license.234
Under UCC sections 2-602(1) and 2-606(1)(b) Zeidenberg could
have returned the product if, after inspecting the license, he was
unwilling to agree to all the terms.235 Zeidenberg chose instead to
inspect the license, try the product, and then keep the product to
resell it on a commercial basis, thus violating the license.236 Zei-
denberg was held to the shrink-wrap agreement because he ac-
cepted the goods and accepted the terms of the license by clicking
through the start of the program.237
While the material contained in ProCD's database was avail-
able elsewhere, ProCD compiled it and released it only under the
terms of the license agreement."8 The court held that since Zei-
denberg was aware of the license and had the opportunity to re-
turn the product if he did not wish to comply with the license,
then the shrink-wrap agreement was enforceable against him.239
The court went so far as to say that this kind of license would
make the information accessible on a larger scale, which would
induce competition, and therefore, decrease the price of the indi-
vidual products. 24 ° Finally, the court said that the shrink-wrap li-
cense would be "enforceable unless their terms are objectionable
on grounds applicable to contracts in general. . .. ""
Unfortunately, this precedent-setting case does not answer all
the necessary questions. For one, the decision addressed UCC
section 2-207, but decided the issue was irrelevant because the
case at bar only had one form.24 2 This conclusion directly contra-
dicts both Step-Saver and Arizona Retail Systems where the re-
233. Id. at 1452-53.
234. Id. at 1452.
235. Id.; see also U.C.C. §§ 2-602, 2-606 (1978).
236. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452-53.
237. Id. at 1452.
238. Id. at 1449.
239. Id. at 1451.
240. Id. at 1453.
241. Id. at 1449.
242. Id. at 1452.
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spective courts held that a "battle of the forms" existed after only
a telephone order.243 ProCD also held that UCC section 2-207 only
applied to merchants.2" If this is true, then why does the second
sentence of UCC section 2-207(2) refer directly to merchants,
while merchants are not mentioned in subsection one or the first
sentence of subsection two?24 5 It is important to note that the
holding in ProCD was made without any prior legal precedent.246
Under a section 2-207(1) and (2) analysis, the terms that are on
the inside of the box or in the agreement that you click through
would be considered proposals for addition to the contract.247 It is
this language that makes the opportunity to return the product at
the distributor's expense so important. If, after seeing all terms of
the license, the purchaser has the opportunity to return the prod-
uct and chooses not to, their conduct seems to indicate that they
know of and understand the terms of the contract. 248 This is es-
sentially the analysis from Step-Saver and Arizona Retail Sys-
tems.2 49
Section 2-207(3) allows for the parties' actions to determine if a
contract exists.2 50 If a section 2-207 analysis was done, under the
guidance of Step-Saver and Arizona Retail Systems, with the ac-
knowledgment of the application to a non-merchant in ProCD,
then the court could have removed some of the ambiguity that
was left in this decision.
Additionally, if the court had addressed the issue of section 2-
207, there would be the inclusion of "rolling contract" concerns.
These "rolling contracts" mean that the contract is not formed
when the product is bought, but when the purchaser opens the
package and ultimately becomes aware of the additional
terms; in other words, "money now terms later."251 These con-
243. See discussion supra Parts III.A, C.
244. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
245. See U.C.C. § 2-707 (1978).
246. See Thomas J. McCarthy et al., Survey: Sales, 53 Bus. LAW. 1461, 1464 (1998).
247. See U.C.C. § 2-207 (1978).
248. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
249. See discussion supra Parts III.A, C.
250. See U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (1978).
251. Goodman, supra note 44, at 353-54.
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tracts cause some concern that there is adhesion, and therefore,
unconscionability. 212
E. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.
Not long after the ProCD ruling came down, the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals handed down another precedent-setting
case, Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.2"' Hill dealt with some of the am-
biguities that remained after the ProCD decision, including the
enforceability of "rolling contracts." The Hills ordered a computer
by phone and when the computer arrived so did a list of terms in-
side the box.254 The terms, one of which was an arbitration clause,
were said to govern unless the consumer returned the computer
within thirty days.2 5 The Hills were not told of any terms at the
time of ordering the product, and when they received the com-
puter and looked at the terms, the arbitration clause did not
"stand out."256 The Hills filed a lawsuit against Gateway alleging,
"among other things, that the products shortcomings made Gate-
way a racketeer."257 Gateway wanted the arbitration clause en-
forced against the Hills, but the trial judge refused, and Gateway
took an immediate appeal.25 '
The Hills admitted to "noticing" the terms that came inside the
box, but they denied reading them thoroughly. 9 The court noted
that no law or statute required an arbitration clause to "stand
out" and held that the agreement to arbitrate should be en-
forced.260
UCC section 2-204 again applied as a "rolling acceptance" pe-
riod arose. 1 The court also stated that for a contract to be effec-
252. Id.
253. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
254. Id. at 1148.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1148, 1151.
261. See id. at 1148-49; see also supra Part MlI.D.
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tive, it did not need to be read. 2 "People who accept take the risk
that the unread terms may in retrospect prove unwelcome."263
The court relied heavily on ProCD, commenting on the binding
nature of terms that were included within the product's box.2"4
The Seventh Circuit held that so long as there was an opportu-
nity to return the product if the consumer was unwilling to com-
ply with the license terms, "[a] vendor, as master of the offer, may
invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose limitations on the
kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance."265 Gateway relied on
this legal proposition to bind their customers to the license
terms.266
According to the court, consumers generally do not have
enough time to read all the restrictions included with products
that are purchased. 267 Nor would it be reasonable to expect a
salesperson to spend an exorbitant amount of time reading the
terms to every customer.26 It is not a productive way of doing
business.2 69 Instead, the use of shrink-wrap agreements with a re-
turn-or-approve policy should be applied to encourage a more pro-
lific business arrangement.27 °
The Hills sued Gateway in part because they had problems
with the quality of the product.27' Their claim sought to invoke
the warranty that came with the product since they were not sat-
isfied with the company's response.27 2 The warranty bound Gate-
way to future performance after the customer purchased the
product. 3 Because they invoked the warranty, the Hills contra-
dicted themselves in saying that once they received the product
and Gateway received the money, all obligations were satisfied. 4
262. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1148-49 (quoting ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir.
1996)).
266. Id. at 1149.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1148.
272. Id. at 1149.
273. Id. at 1149-50.
274. See id. at 1149.
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That is, the Hills couldn't invoke one part of the warranty to their
benefit while ignoring the rest.275 For Gateway to have been
bound under the terms of the agreement, the Hills must also have
been bound.276
The Hills argued that ProCD was irrelevant because they were
not "merchants," and therefore, could not be bound under UCC
section 2-207(2).277 As the Hill court pointed out, however, the
reason the ProCD court did not analyze section 2-207 was be-
cause the question in that case was one of how and when a con-
tract may be formed, not whether terms can be added after the
formation." The Hills' faulty reasoning on this argument left
them in an awkward position since they essentially had come up
with a reason for ProCD's victory that was not part of that case's
holding. The way the Hills interpreted ProCD, ProCD was victo-
rious because Zeidenberg was a merchant and fell under the
"unless" clause of section 2-207(2).279
This deft dodge by the Hill court did not take into account the
language of section 2-207 or the holdings of Step-Saver and Ari-
zona Retail Systems, which required no forms to make it a "battle
of the forms" case." ° Further, it did not resolve how a consumer
or a merchant is to determine the difference between a box-top/
shrink-wrap situation like Step-Saver and Arizona Retail Systems
and a box-top situation like ProCD and Hill.
In ProCD, Zeidenberg's product box had the printed statement
that there were additional terms inside.28 ' Therefore, the Hills'
second argument was that they could not be bound because they
were unaware that there were additional terms inside the box.
28 2
This argument was not well founded. Once they opened the prod-
uct box and were presented with the list of terms, the Hills were
aware of the license.2"3 But even this arguably goes beyond the
factual scope of the case because the Hills knew before they
275. See id.
276. Id. at 1150.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See discussion supra Parts HL.A, C.
281. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
282. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.
283. See id.
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placed their order that the computer carton would include impor-
tant terms.28 4 Gateway's advertisements specifically articulated
this fact.28 5 If the Hills had purchased the product in a store, then
whether the additional terms were acknowledged on the outside
of the box might have been a more legally relevant question, but
that was not the case.286
Hill involved a phone order, and therefore, the need for the
statement of additional terms was not necessary.287 In fact, the
court felt that customers were better off when vendors cut unnec-
essary costs like phone recitation.2 8 If the Hills had not opened
the box for more than thirty days, they would have had a good ar-
gument that a notice of additional terms was necessary in order
to bind them.2 9 However, based on Gateway's advertisements,
the Hills knew that when the box came, it would include some
terms.29 ° In either case, the Hills opened the box within thirty
days and were made aware of these terms.29' In their situation,
the notice of additional terms would not have prevented them
from purchasing, since they did not see the box before the pur-
chase was made.292
The mere fact that the additional terms were not mentioned on
the outside of the box was also not a strong argument. If the Hills
had been concerned about what the advertisements mentioned,
they could have requested a copy of the terms or warranty before
purchasing the computer.293 The court also pointed out that the
Hills could have consulted public sources, such as the Internet or
Better Business Bureau.294 Even if the Hills chose not to pursue
those avenues, they had the final option of sending the product
back within thirty days if the terms were not to their liking.295
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See id.
287. Id. at 1149.
288. Id.
289. See id.
290. Id. at 1150.
291. Id.
292. See id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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ProCD supports the decision in this case and upholds the 11-
cense agreement and additional terms if contract formation oc-
curred when the Hills kept the computer for thirty days.29 The
court found that because the Hills were competent adults and
aware of the terms, they would be bound by the contract.29" The
Hills chose to keep the product after reading the terms and were
thereby restricted by the arbitration clause, just as Gateway was
bound by the warranty clause.29
But what result under Step-Saver? Step-Saver held that the
contract between TSL and Step-Saver was formed under section
2-207, not section 2-204, when Step-Saver ordered, TSL shipped,
and Step-Saver paid.299 With the contract completed, any gaps
would be filled with standard UCC provisions."0 Any additional
terms submitted by the parties were only proposals requiring
some sort of assent beyond just using the software the way they
had intended from the point of formation.3 ' The only difference
between the circumstances in Step-Saver and those in Hill is that
the parties exchanged invoices and purchase orders that agreed
on the goods and price." 2 Essentially, this is what Hill and Gate-
way did in their phone transaction, except rather than sending a
purchase order, the Hills gave their credit card number.0 3
Gateway and the Hill court find more agreeable precedent with
Arizona Retail Systems. Gateway could point to the section ofAri-
zona Retail Systems that dealt with the initial contract separately
from all the subsequent transactions.0 4 But then the question
arises, were the Hills ordering a trial computer, a "demo," or an
appliance that they planned to put immediately into service?0 5
Additionally, the problem remains, how is a consumer, based on
the following precedent, to know when the contract is formed, so
296. Id. at 1148-50.
297. Id. at 1149.
298. Id. at 1149-50.
299. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 99 (3d Cir. 1991).
300. Id. at 100-01; see also U.C.C. § 2-204 (1978).
30L See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 100-01; see also U.C.C. § 2-207 (1978).
302. See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 96.
303. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
304. See discussion supra Part 1I.C.
305. See id. (applying logic of Arizona Retail Systems that the enforceability of the li-
cense with regard to demo software hinged on the fact that the software was to be tried
out). Conversely in Hill, the argument could be made that the Hills were buying an appli-
ance that they planned to put immediately in service.
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that he can determine the applicability and enforceability of the
terms of a shrink-wrap license?
F. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc.
Following its victory in Hill, Gateway found itself embroiled in
yet another dispute regarding the terms in its shrink-wrap
agreement. This time the mandatory arbitration clause was the
focus of inquiry in Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc.0 6 Brower, de-
cided by the First Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
New York, followed the precedent of Hill, but remanded the case
to determine whether Gateway's concession regarding arbitration
was as unconscionable as its original terms."7
Brower was a class action lawsuit in which the plaintiffs com-
plained of deceptive sales practices in seven causes of action. °8
These included breach of warranty, breach of contract, fraud, and
unfair trade practices." 9 The plaintiffs in Brower, like the Hills,
were angry about Gateway's failure to provide customer service
and technical support.310 Gateway moved to dismiss the complaint
based on the arbitration clause in the shrink-wrap license pack-
aged with the computer. 1'
The plaintiffs, in order to survive dismissal, argued that the
arbitration clause was not part of the terms of the contract under
section 2-207.312 In the alternative, plaintiffs argued that the ar-
bitration clause was unconscionable under section 2-302 and that
the contract was one of adhesion and ultimately unenforceable.1 3
To support this proposition, the plaintiffs explained how difficult
and costly it was to use the arbitration forum that Gateway had
designated.314 Expense and accessibility being prohibitive, the
306. 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998).
307. Id. at 574-75.
308. Id. at 570.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 570-71; see also supra Part III.E. (discussing Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105
F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997)).
311. Id. at 571.
312. Id.
313. Id.; see also U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978).
314. Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
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plaintiffs argued that no reasonable consumer could be expected
to appreciate the significance of the arbitration term.315
In support of their adhesion argument, the plaintiffs pointed
out that the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), the
arbitration body Gateway had chosen, was not commonly used for
consumer matters. 16 Additionally, the ICC headquarters was lo-
cated in France, and it was difficult to locate not only the organi-
zation, but its rules as well." 7 To illustrate this point, the plain-
tiffs showed that the ICC was not registered with the Secretary of
State of New York."' In fact, almost all of the plaintiffs' efforts to
contact the ICC had been unsuccessful.3 9 The plaintiffs eventu-
ally succeeded in obtaining the ICC's rules through the United
States Council for International Business, which maintained spo-
radic communications with the ICC.320
To buttress their argument, the plaintiffs showed that the cost
of ICC arbitration was prohibitive; a claim of less than $50,000
required advance fees of $4,000-$2,000 of which was nonrefund-
able even if the consumer won.32' This amount was far in excess
of the value of most Gateway products and any recovery an ag-
grieved consumer could hope to obtain.322 The ICC also followed
the European model, or the "loser pays" model, where the loser of
the litigation has to pay not only all of their own expenses, includ-
ing travel to Chicago, Illinois, but the expenses of their opponent
as well.3"
The court, in resolving this dispute, relied heavily on Hill.
3 24
Similar to Hill, the Brower court determined formation to be after
the non-merchant plaintiffs had kept their computers for thirty
days, making section 2-207 inapplicable since there was only one
form.32
5
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
32L Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 571-72.
325. Id.
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The court also rejected the plaintiffs' second argument that the
arbitration clause was unenforceable as a contract of adhesion.326
The court held that while the parties did not possess equal bar-
gaining power, that alone was not enough.327 According to the
court, a consumer has the ultimate choice of whether to buy a
computer from Gateway over the phone or to buy a computer
from some other entity at a retail facility.3 2' This choice, in the
eyes of the court, more than made up for the disparity in bargain-
ing power.3 29 Additionally, the court was persuaded by the argu-
ment that a consumer had thirty days to inspect and use the
product, and if he was unsatisfied could return it for a refund.33 °
The court acknowledged that returning the goods to avoid the
formation of the contract was an affirmative action that may im-
pose an expense upon the consumer.33' However, in the court's
view, these burdens were balanced by the convenience and ease of
ordering the computer over the phone.332
Next, the court addressed the alleged unconscionability of the
arbitration clause.333 Under New York law, unconscionability re-
quires that a contract be both procedurally and substantively un-
conscionable.334
[T]here must be "some showing of an 'absence of meaningful choice
on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which
are unreasonably favorable to the other party.'"... [T]he purpose of
this doctrine [of unconscionability] is not to redress the inequality
between the parties but simply to ensure that the more powerful
party cannot "surprise" the other party with some overly oppressive
term.
335
326. Id. at 572-73.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. See id.
330. See id.
331. Id. But see supra Parts III.A (discussing Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech.,
939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991)), III.C (discussing Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link,
Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993)).
332. Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 572-73. But see supra Parts III.A (discussing Step-Saver
Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991)), III.C. (discussing Arizona Retail
Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993)).
333. Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
334. Id.
335. Id. (citations omitted).
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To determine whether or not a transaction suffers from proce-
dural unconscionability, a court will look to the contract forma-
tion process to determine if, in fact, one party "lacked any mean-
ingful choice in entering into the contract."336 The court considers
such factors as "the setting of the transaction, the experience and
education of the party claiming unconscionability, whether the
contract contained 'fine print,' whether the seller used 'high pres-
sure' tactics, and any disparity in the parties' bargaining
power."
337
The court held that in this transaction the terms were not pro-
cedurally unconscionable. 338 To begin with, any consumer could
return the product in thirty days, ample time to inspect, inter-
pret, and reject the seller's terms.3 9 The agreement was titled in
large print and contained sixteen paragraphs appearing in the
same size print.3" The arbitration clause was not "hidden" within
the text of the document,34' nor was the consumer placed in a pre-
carious position by returning the merchandise to avoid formation
of the contract. 42 In other words, procedurally, there was nothing
wrong with the contract, but this punch was telegraphed by the
court's allegiance to the Hill decision. 43
Substantive unconscionability requires an "examination of the
substance of the agreement in order to determine whether the
terms unreasonably favor one party."3 The court found that the
forum selection terms did not rise to the level of unconscionabil-
ity, but the high cost in arbitrating before the ICC served as a de-
terrent to a consumer who wished to invoke the process.345 The
consumer, once barred from the courts by the arbitration clause,
was effectively barred from seeking any redress at all due to the
high cost of the ICC forum.346 The court found this combination of
336. Id.
337. Id. (citing Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 534 N.E.2d 824,828 (N.Y. 1988)).
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 573-74.
343. See id. at 571-72, 574 (analyzing Hill with approval).
344. Id. at 574 (citing Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 534 N.E.2d 824, 829 (N.Y.
1988)).
345. Id.
346. Id.
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elements to be unconscionable.347 While the court noted that un-
conscionability in New York generally relied on both procedural
and substantive unconscionability, substantive unconscionability
on its own could be sufficient to render the terms of a contract
unenforceable.348
Brower stands for the proposition that shrink-wrap agreements
and "rolling contracts" are acceptable so long as they do not vio-
late the rules of unconscionability. However, consumers are still
left to wonder whether the phone call to the mail order computer
store is an "offer" and the shipment on the part of the vendor acts
as an "acceptance," thereby forming a contract.349 On the other
hand, do ProCD, Hill, and Brower control, mandating that the
consumer's phone call becomes an invitation to offer?35 That invi-
tation would set into motion the steps necessary to form a "rolling
contract."35' The courts' deference to efficient business compounds
this problem because, according to Hill and Brower, time is too
precious to waste dictating over the phone to the consumer ex-
actly what type of relationship he or she is entering.3 52
G. Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp.
Following the ProCD and the Gateway decisions, various courts
addressed additional issues concerning shrink-wrap-type licenses.
One of these cases was Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp.353 This class ac-
tion suit was brought before the Superior Court of Delaware by
the plaintiffs because they believed a Zip drive manufactured by
Iomega caused damage to their computer storage disks. 4 The
plaintiffs alleged a breach of the implied warranty of merchant-
ability claiming that the defendant had not properly satisfied the
conspicuous requirement of the Delaware Code. 55 The plaintiffs'
allegations were based on the fact that the disclaimer was located
347. Id. at 575.
348. Id. at 574.
349. See supra Parts III.A, C.
350. See supra Parts III.D-E.
351. See supra Part II.D (discussing ProCD); supra Part III.E (discussing Hill).
352. See supra Part III.E (discussing Hill).
353. C.A. No. 98C-09-064 RRC, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 563 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 3,
1999).
354. Id. at *2.
355. Id. at *3.
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inside the packaging." 6 They claimed, in part, that "the dis-
claimer, located in the packaging of the product, could not realis-
tically be called to the attention of the consumer until after the
sale had been consummated, thus rendering the disclaimer not
'conspicuous' as a matter or [sic] law and therefore ineffective." "35
The court looked to ProCD and Hill for guidance, though the
issue was somewhat varied.3 58 For something to be "conspicuous,"
it must be "written in a way that a reasonable person against
whom it is to operate ought to notice it."359 The purpose is "to pro-
tect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained for language of
disclaimer."6 ° This related to the shrink-wrap license issue set
forth in ProCD.36' The court in ProCD found that additional terms
inside the packaging could still bind the party, so long as the
party was able to return the product if the terms were not agree-
able.362 The ProCD court determined that for all of the terms to be
included on the outside packaging, the distributor would have to
use microscopic type which would bring up UCC section 2-316 is-
sues concerning typeface and character size.363
The Rinaldi court pointed out that while ProCD was dealing
with a shrink-wrap license, the rule that came out of the case was
that the UCC permits the use of an "approve-or-return" policy.
364
This allows terms inside the box to become part of the contract,
and the terms are binding on the parties.365
The Rinaldi court also made reference to the commercial prac-
ticalities of doing business in today's market. 66 The Rinaldi
court, much like the ProCD court, found that disclaimers (not
unlike ProOD's license terms) were reasonably placed in the
product's packaging.3 67 The court stated that after purchase, con-
356. Id. at *7.
357. Id. at *10.
358. Id.
359. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 305 (7th ed. 1999).
360. Rinaldi, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 563, at *7 (citing U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. 1 (1962)).
361. See supra Part II.D (discussing ProCD).
362. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
363. Rinaldi, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 563, at *12-13; see also ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450-
51; U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1978).
364. Rinaldi, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 563, at *15.
365. Id. at *14-15.
366. Id. at*19.
367. Id.
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sumers had the opportunity to read the disclaimers and either
keep the product and accept the terms, or reject the terms by re-
turning the product. 6 ' The court accepted the disclaimer, though
inside the packaging, as conspicuous and thus, ruled in Iomega's
favor.
369
H. M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp.
The recent case of M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software
Corp. y ° also involved shrink-wrap license issues and whether
added terms in the limitations and remedies clause are uncon-
scionable.3  Mortenson purchased licensed software from Timber-
line, which Mortenson used to prepare a construction bid 2.3 " After
presenting the bid, Mortenson realized the bid was $1.95 million
less than it was supposed to be.373 Mortenson sued Timberline for
breach of warranties, alleging that the software was defective,
that the licensing agreement in the software packaging was not
part of the parties' contract, and that "the provision limiting [the]
damages to recovery of the purchase price was... unconscion-
able."374
The software was in a case with the frll text of the license
agreement on the outside of each diskette pouch as well as in the
instruction manual.3 " Timberline also had a click-wrap agree-
ment that appeared every time the program was used.376 In addi-
tion, Timberline had wrapped agreements around all of the de-
vices and products shipped to Mortenson.377
The software program malfunctioned nineteen times the day
Mortenson attempted to use the program to make what became
368. Id.
369. Id. But see Goodman, supra note 44, at 358 (arguing that courts should apply ad-
hesion contract law when enforcing "shrink-wrap" agreements found in pre-packaged
software).
370. 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000).
371. See id. at 307.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 308.
376. Id.
377. Id.
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"the unreasonable bid.""8 It later surfaced that the software had
a number of bugs and that numerous complaints had been made
to Timberline. 9 Timberline reacted by sending out an updated
version of the software.38 ° This action showed that the software
was defective.
Mortenson's main argument was that the purchase order alone
was the fully integrated contract to which the parties were bound
and that the additional terms of the license were not part of the
contract.38' The Mortenson court distinguished Step-Saver before
analyzing and basing its decision on ProCD.382 According to the
Mortenson court, Step-Saver did not apply because "this is a case
about contract formation, not contract alteration."8 3 Factually,
the Mortenson court distinguished Step-Saver on the grounds
that Step-Saver was not about the "enforceability of a standard
license agreement against an end-user."3" Step-Saver, according
to the Mortenson court, regarded the applicability of a shrink-
wrap license agreement to a middleman "who [was] simply in-
clud[ing] the software in an integrated system" and "had been as-
sured that the license did not apply."385
The court, in analyzing this case, found that the parties did not
intend for the purchase order to be the full contract. 6 It also
found "that the purchase order did not prevent the terms of the
license from becoming part of the contract or render the limita-
tion of [the] remedies clause unenforceable."3 7 Mortenson at-
tempted to argue that the license terms were merely requests to
add new terms to the contract.8 The court followed ProCD and
held that the terms of the license were part of the contract.389
378. Id. at 309.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 309-10.
382. See id. at 312-13; see supra Part DI.D (discussing ProCD).
383. Mortenson, 998 P.2d at 312; supra Part IIIA (discussing Step-Saver).
384. Mortenson, 998 P.2d at 312.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 313.
387. Id. at 310-11.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 313.
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Thus, when Mortenson used the software, he agreed to the
terms.3 9°
Mortenson's final argument was that even if he was bound by
the license terms, the limited remedies clause was unconscion-
able. 91 The court did not find that the limited remedies clause
was one-sided or overly harsh.3 92 For instance, Mortenson had the
option to return the program and not be bound by the clause.393
He chose to take advantage of the program and was therefore
bound by the contract terms. 4 The court ultimately declared that
Timberline's license terms were valid, enforceable, and binding on
Mortenson 5
The Mortenson case was one of the most recent cases to be
based on the Seventh Circuit's rationale provided in ProCD and
Hill. Unfortunately, the Washington Supreme Court completely
disregarded the Third Circuit's analysis and distinguished Step-
Saver and Arizona Retail Systems as cases that deal with altera-
tion of contracts rather than formation. 96 Disturbingly, the foun-
dation of the Seventh Circuit's "rolling contract" logic that the
Washington Supreme Court accepted is itself without founda-
tion.397 The rule announced in ProCD is not consistent with tradi-
tional contract logic and flies in the face of not only the Third Cir-
cuit (ProCd, Hill), but the First Circuit as well 398 and seems to
adopt a position it denounced a long time ago.3 99 While the Sev-
enth Circuit very astutely recognizes the need for efficiency in e-
commerce, it seems to be willing to sacrifice consumer protection
to achieve that goal.400
I. Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.
The most recent case to interpret the enforceability of shrink-
390. Id.
391. Id. at 314.
392. See id. at 314-15.
393. See id. at 313, 315.
394. See id. at 315-16.
395. Id. at 316.
396. See id. at 312; see also id. at 317 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
397. See Goodman, supra note 44, at 350; see also McCarthy, supra note 246, at 1464.
398. See Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc., 110 F.3d 184, 188-89 (1st Cir. 1997).
399. See Roto-Lith Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
400. See McCarthy, supra note 246, at 1466.
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wrap licenses is Klocek v. Gateway, Inc."1 Klocek articulates the
split in authority between the Seventh Circuit (ProCd and Hill)
and the Third Circuit (Step-Saver).°2 The Klocek court notes that
the shrink-wrap cases have all turned on the formation of the
contract between the parties. °3 The United States District Court
for the District of Kansas refused to follow ProCD and its progeny
in favor of the UCC section 2-207 analysis adopted by the Step-
Saver court.404
The Klocek dispute arose out of the "purchase[ ] of a Gateway
computer and a Hewlett-Packard scanner."4 5 The typical Gate-
way scenario ensued with the plaintiff alleging false advertising
and breach of contract, and Gateway seeking shelter under the
arbitration agreement in its shrink-wrap license.0 6 Gateway also
pointed out that it mailed a copy of its quarterly magazine to all
existing customers which contained a notice of a change in the
arbitration terms of the shrink-wrap license.40 7 The nature of the
change was to expand a consumer's choice in arbitration bodies.408
These facts are not all that revealing as they tend to exemplify
the pattern of litigation surrounding Gateway's shrink-wrap li-
cense. However, what is extremely intriguing is footnote one in
the Klocek court's analysis, which states, "[nleither party explains
why-if the arbitration agreement was an enforceable contract-
Gateway was entitled to unilaterally amend it by sending a
magazine to computer customers."40 9
Gateway, as if anticipating the Kiocek court's disapproval of its
shrink-wrap license agreement, made a policy argument based on
the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").410 As the court pointed out,
"The FAA ensures that written arbitration agreements in mari-
time transactions and transactions involving interstate commerce
are 'valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.' Federal policy favors ar-
401. 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000).
402. Id. at 1337.
403. Id. at 1338.
404. Id. at 1338-40.
405. Id. at 1334.
406. Id.; see also supra Part II.E (discussing Hill); supra Part ILI.F (discussing
Brower).
407. K/ocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1335 n.1.
408. Id. For an explanation for this change, see supra Part III.F (discussing Brower).
409. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1335 n.1.
410. Id. at 1335.
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bitration agreements and requires that we 'rigorously enforce'
them. 'Any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration."'41' The court was per-
suaded that arbitration could be compelled but placed an "initial
summary-judgment-like burden of establishing that it [was] enti-
tled to arbitration" on Gateway.412 Gateway ultimately failed to
meet this burden.413
The Klocek court held that the holes in the evidentiary record
were too big to allow it to agree with Gateway and compel arbi-
tration.414 While there was some question as to whether Missouri
or Kansas law would apply, the court ultimately determined that
it did not matter because both states had adopted the UCC, which
governed the transaction.4 5
The court then acknowledged the split in authority between the
Seventh Circuit (ProCD, Hill), the Third Circuit (Step-Saver), and
the District of Arizona (Arizona Retail Systems).4 6 The court de-
termined that the split in authority was attributable to the point
in time that each individual court determined the formation of
the contract to be complete.4 7 Here, "[t]he Court [was] not per-
suaded that Kansas or Missouri courts would follow the Seventh
Circuit .... [Tihe Seventh Circuit concluded without support that
UCC § 2-207 was irrelevant because the cases involved only one
written form."418
According to the Klocek court, UCC section 2-207 disputes often
arise under a "battle of the forms" scenario, but nothing in the
language of section 2-207 precludes its application to scenarios
where there is only one form.41 9 In fact, the court pointed to the
411. Id. (citations omitted).
412. Id. at 1336.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 1336-37.
416. Id. at 1337-38.
417. Id. at 1338.
418. Id. at 1339; see also sources cited supra note 397.
419. Id.; UCC section 2-207 provides:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirma-
tion which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the addi-
tional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
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official comment of section 2-207 noting that, "2-207(1) and (2)
apply 'where an agreement has been reached orally... and is fol-
lowed by one or both of the parties sending formal memoranda
embodying the terms so far agreed and adding terms not dis-
cussed.' 4 20 The court noted that both Kansas and Missouri have
adopted this analytical approach, and therefore, UCC section 2-
207 applied to the dispute.42'
After announcing that UCC section 2-207 was applicable, the
court scrutinized the contractual labels of the parties. 2 The K/-
cek court took exception to the ProCD court's finding that "the
vendor is the master of the offer."4 2 "In typical consumer transac-
tions, the purchaser is the offeror, and the vendor is the of-
feree."4 24 The general exception is when a price quote can amount
to an offer if it reasonably appears that assent is the only thing
required to turn the quote into a contract.4 25 However, the court
ruled that Gateway had not shown any evidence which would
place the controversy under this narrow exception. 6
Therefore, in the Klocek court's eyes, Klocek made the offer
that Gateway accepted when it shipped the computer. 7 With
formation determined, the court proceeded with the section 2-207
analysis. 2 ' According to the court, under section 2-207, Gateway's
shrink-wrap license was "either an expression of acceptance or [a]
written confirmation. As an expression of acceptance, the Stan-
dard Terms [shrink-wrap license] would constitute a counteroffer
only if Gateway expressly made its acceptance conditional on
plaintiffs assent to the additional or different terms."4 29 The court
stated, "'the conditional nature of the acceptance must be clearly
expressed in a manner sufficient to notify the offeror that the of-
feree is unwilling to proceed with the transaction unless the addi-
contract [if the contract is not between merchants].
U.C.C. § 2-207 (1978).
420. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1339 (citing U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1 (1978)).
421. Id. at 1339-40.
422. Id. at 1340-41.
423. Id. at 1340 (citing ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996)).
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
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tional or different terms are included in the contract.' 43 ° The
court found the record barren of any such notice.4
Kiocek created confusion with regard to which test to use when
determining whether or not conditional acceptance has been ade-
quately communicated to and acted upon by the offeror. One view
holds that, "the offeree's response stating a materially different
term solely to the disadvantage of the offeror constitutes a condi-
tional acceptance."432 The other end of the spectrum holds "that
the conditional nature of the acceptance should be so clearly ex-
pressed in a manner sufficient to notify the offeror that the of-
feree is unwilling to proceed without the additional or different
terms."433 The middle ground "approach requires that the re-
sponse predicate acceptance on clarification, addition or modifica-
tion."434 The court noted that the first standard had been over-
ruled and that Gateway did not satisfy either of the other two
standards, so deciding which one was applicable was irrelevant.435
The Klocek court vindicated the Hills by deciding that the
plaintiff in the case at bar, in almost exactly the same situation
as the Hills, was not a merchant.4 6 Because Klocek was not a
merchant, the additional terms contained in the shrink-wrap li-
cense were not part of the contract. Gateway argued that Ko-
cek accepted the terms by keeping the computer more than five
days. 3 8 The court agreed that under the terms of the contract the
plaintiffs' retention of the computer for more than five days would
430. Id. (quoting Brown Mach., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 416, 420 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989)).
431. Id. at 1341.
432. Id. at 1340 n.12.
433. Id. at 1340-41 n.12.
434. Id. at 1341 n.12.
435. Id. at 1341.
436. Id.; see supra Part III.E (discussing Hill). The Seventh Circuit held that it did not
matter that the Hills were not merchants because UCC section 2-207 did not apply. Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997).
437. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1341; see also U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1978).
The additional terms are to become construed as proposals for additions to the con-
tract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within
a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
Id.
438. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
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bind them to the terms of the contract. 3 9 However, Gateway
failed to prove that the contract was binding at all; therefore, the
five-day retention period term was neither effective nor enforce-
able." ° Further, the court was unpersuaded by the argument that
keeping the computer for more than five days, by itself, demon-
strated assent." 1
Thus concludes the most recent chapter in the shrink-wrap
saga. However, more questions are left than answered. Which
courts' rationale controls, that of the Seventh Circuit, the Third
Circuit, or one of the numerous state or federal district courts
that have analyzed the shrink-wrap problem? If nothing else, the
body of case law points to a discrepancy in the law which seems to
invite the intervention of the United States Supreme Court. The
ultimate outcome of this controversy, however, may depend on
whether Supreme Court appointments are made by President
George W. Bush.
J. Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C.
One last case pertains to the discussion of UETA, UCITA, and
other proposed e-commerce legislation. Caspi v. Microsoft Net-
work, L.L.C."2 analogized shrink-wrap licenses and agreements
to click-wrap licenses and agreements." In Caspi, the Appellate
Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey agreed with the fu-
ture UCITA by holding an "on-screen click" acceptable conduct
sufficient to bind a party to a contract, so long as the user had a
reasonable opportunity to read the contract.'" In Caspi, prospec-
tive MSN members were prompted by the software to view the
membership agreement."5 The agreement appeared in a scroll-
able computer screen with two choices stating "I Agree" or "I
Don't Agree." "6 Potential members had the option to click either
response at any time while viewing the agreement."7 The agree-
439. Id.
440. Id.
4.4L Id.
442. 732 A!2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
443. Id. at 532.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 530.
446. Id.
447. Id.
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ment also contained a forum selection clause, which stated that
all actions deriving from the agreement would be venued in King
County, Washington." Potential members incurred no charges
until they viewed the agreement, or were afforded an opportunity
to view, and clicked the "I Agree" button." 9
In Caspi, the court held that the forum selection clause, as well
as the rest of the contract, was enforceable because members
could scroll through the contract and read it before clicking the
mouse in agreement.5 ° Thus, according to the court, the ability to
scroll through numerous computer screens is sufficient to make
an online agreement enforceable. 451' The court felt that medium
alone is insufficient to hold a contract unenforceable, because just
as individuals can read through the fine print of a written agree-
ment, they can also read through fine print on a computer
screen.
452
One problem with contracts like the one at issue in Caspi is
whether the person who clicks the "I Agree" button has the au-
thority to do so. Traditional agency law is hard to apply because,
when dealing with the electronic medium, it is hard to decipher
"apparent authority" when individuals are not seeking or talking
with each other. Thus, UCITA requires attribution to the sender
as evidence of authorization.453 Under UCITA, attribution to the
sender occurs when: (1) it was sent by the sender; (2) there was a
commercially reasonable attribution procedure used; or (3) the
sender was negligent and the receiver detrimentally relied on
it. 454 UCITA does not, however, define what "commercially rea-
sonable" is; that is left for the courts to define.455
448. Id. at 529.
449. Id. at 530.
450. Id. at 532.
451. Id. at 530.
452. Id. at 531.
453. See U.C.I.T.A. §§ 108, 212-13 (2001).
454. See id.
455. See id. § 212.
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IV. STATE LEGISLATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF UETA &
UCITA
A. State Legislation
Prior to E-SIGN, about forty-four states had enacted, or were
considering, legislation to account for signed writings in the elec-
tronic context.4 56 Utah was the first state that recognized the
need for revolutionizing the Statute of Frauds when it enacted
the Digital Signatures Act in 1995."' Under the Utah approach, a
digitally signed message satisfies both the "writing" and "signing"
requirement of the Statute of Frauds.45 In order to understand
the significance of this Act and others modeled on it, it is neces-
sary to examine the technology underlying Utah's Digital Signa-
ture Act.
Essentially, digital signatures allow for authentication of
documents transferred online.45 9 Authentication is important to
online contracts because it provides the security and accuracy
consumers and buyers are searching for over the Internet.460 For
example, companies that receive credit card numbers can defend
against fraud by using the digital signature to verify the identity
of the purchaser, or an e-mailed offer of employment could be le-
gally binding if sent and signed by the employer.
One way of producing a digital signature is through the use of
encryption.46' Encryption is based on the use of two mathematical
keys to encode and decode the signature of the sender.462 The sig-
nature is encrypted on the text of the electronic message to verify
the original content, sender, and whether alteration or tampering
has occurred.463 The signature is composed of two encrypted keys,
456. Ballard, supra note 4, at B6.
457. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to -504 (1999); Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Moving with
Change: Electronic Signature Legislation as a Vehicle for Advancing E-Commerce, 17 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 723, 726 (1999).
458. See Smedinghoff, supra note 457, at 726.
459. John A Chanin, The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act: A Practi-
tioner's View, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 279, 305 (1999).
460. Id. at 305-06.
461. Scoville, supra note 53, at 349 (explaining that encryption was the focus of the
Utah Digital Signature Act, however there are other methods, each with their own pecu-
liar drawbacks); see Alvarez & Clausing, supra note 1.
462. Scoville, supra note 53, at 349-50.
463. Id. at 352-54.
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one private, one public.464 The private key is kept solely in the
possession of, and known only to, the sender of the message
whereas the public key is made publicly available. 465 The two
keys are mathematically related such that a message decrypted
by the public key could only have been encrypted by the private
key.466 Thus, one can decode with the public key and verify the
owner of the private key, but not be able to deduce the code of the
private key.467 Further, the two keys provide a built-in security
system because if the message has been tampered with or altered
in any way, the public key will be unable to decrypt the message,
indicating there has been an alteration since signing.46
8
Digital signature keys are purchased by the sender and issued
through a Certification Authority ("CA").4 69 A CA is usually a
trusted third party such as a bank or company specializing in the
470 rodigital signature process. The role of a CA is to verify the re-
spective identities of parties possessing key pairs and then to cer-
tify the digital signatures of the parties involved in the transac-
tion. Once the CA has verified the "private key," or signature of
the sender, the CA will inform the recipient of the digitally signed
message which "public key" is necessary to decode the message.
4 72
While encrypted digital signature technology provides the abil-
ity to authenticate and legally bind parties to online contracts, it
is not without its disadvantages. First, the mere cost factor of
purchasing keys and setting up CAs may provide a barrier to
immediate implementation. Not only will companies/consumers
have to purchase the software, they must also train employees on
the encryption/decryption process.
Second, the lack of uniformity in the nationwide implementa-
tion of digital signatures poses problems for the widespread ac-
ceptance and use of such technology.4 3 While many states have
recognized some form of digital signature, each state has tailored
464. Id. at 351-52.
465. Id. at 351.
466. Id. at 352-53.
467. Id. at 351.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 352.
470. Id. at 352-53.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Scoville, supra note 53, at 400-01.
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this use to meet their own needs and not the needs of nationwide
implementation.474
California, the second state to respond to the influx of elec-
tronic commerce and the Statute of Frauds controversy, enacted
Chapter 78." Under Chapter 78, a written contract is no longer
needed in sophisticated business contracts involving derivative,
foreign exchange, and certain other financial market transac-
tions, known collectively as "qualified financial contracts."476
This abolishment of a written contract requirement under
Chapter 78 is only applicable to qualified financial contracts that:
(1) cannot be performed within one year; (2) are for the sale of
goods over $500; and (3) are for the sale of personal property over
$5,000.47' Further, Chapter 78 requires independent evidence
that an agreement exists.47 Such evidence may come in the form
of a printed copy of any electronic communication so long as a
hard copy is provided.479 Additionally, an enforceable contract can
be created by sending a confirmation within five business days of
an agreement.80 The responding party has three business days
upon receiving the confirmation to send a rejection, and without
it, the contract will prevail.4"' By passing Chapter 78, California
has recognized the continuous and rapidly changing face of mod-
ern technology in the business world* by accommodating new
forms of communication under the Statute of Frauds in order to
facilitate the transactional process.
California's minimalist and technology-neutral approach to
digital signatures was much different than the Utah Digital Sig-
natures Act, which tended to focus on issues raised by cryptogra-
phy based digital signatures.482 This technology-neutral attitude
474. Id. Some states embrace the digital signature in its full capacity, while others
maintain that mere electronic signatures will suffice. Id.
475. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(b) (2001). See generally John M. Feser Jr., Has Communi-
cation Technology Rendered the Statute of Frauds a Fraud of a Statute?, 30 McGEoRGE L.
REV. 431 (1999) (describing the background of Chapter 78).
476. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(b) (2001).
477. Id. § 1624(b)(2).
478. Id. § 1624(b)(3).
479. Id. § 1624(b)(3)(A).
480. Id. § 1624(b)(3)(B).
481 Id.
482. See Smedinghoff, supra note 457, at 726.
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was reflected in UETA and UCITA and ultimately in E-SIGN."3
Further, it would seem that states still retain the power under E-
SIGN to determine what types of technology are acceptable to
conduct electronic commerce, with one exception."i E-SIGN spe-
cifically provides that sound technology cannot be used to authen-
ticate a digital signature, so at least for the time being, this type
of technology seems to be on hold." 5
Leaving the states to determine what type of technology is ac-
ceptable to conduct electronic commerce could open up another
can of worms. For example, Utah's legislation is biased, techno-
logically speaking, to cryptography. 6 Contrast this with Georgia
which takes the broader approach that the writing and signature
requirements of the Statute of Frauds will be satisfied by an
"electronic signature."487 A "secure electronic signature" under
Georgia law is a verification method "unique to the person using
it, . . . capable of verification, . . . under the sole control of the
person using it, and ... linked to data in such a manner that if
the data are changed the electronic signature is invalidated.""8
The various state interpretations have resulted in incompatible
technologies that stand in the way of widespread implementation
of online authentication. Therefore, until there is federal legisla-
tion with regards to digital or electronic signatures, it is unclear
which state law will govern the use of digital/electronic signa-
tures and whether the agreement will be enforceable amongst
buyers and sellers of varying states.
B. UCITA
UCITA was the first attempt at creating a uniform body of law
with regard to electronic commerce.489 Originally, UCITA was a
proposed revision to the UCC known as Article 2B to be submit-
ted along with revisions of Articles 1, 2 and 2A.49° After losing the
483. See id. at 726-27.
484. See 15 U.S.C. § 7002 (2000).
485. See id. § 7001.
486. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to -504 (2000).
487. See GA. CODE ANN. § 10-12-4 (2000).
488. Id. § 10-12-3(6).
489. Mayhan & Fennelly, supra note 35, at 63.
490. O'Rourke, supra note 36, at 647.
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support of the ALI, Article 2B was renamed UCITA.49' The draft-
ers of UCITA sought to emulate the state legislation previously
discussed, seeking to replace common law "writing" and "sign-
ing"'492 requirements with the concept of a "record"49 that is "au-
thenticated."494 The term "record" is used as a substitute for the
"writing" requirement, and was designed to add electronically
stored information to writings currently defined under the
UCC.495
UCITA also provided for three methods to form an agreement
or consent to a particular term. The first method is the traditional
"agreement"4 96 between parties by manifesting assent to a record
or term, or by authenticating a record of term.49' The law uses
"authentication"498 in place of a signature requirement. 49 9 Thus
definition allows for the use of digital or other electronic signa-
tures.0 0 Manifestation of assent also was defined.501
491. See Mayhan & Fennelly, supra note 35, at 63.
492. "Sign" means "[tlo identify (a record) by means of a signature, mark, or other sym-
bol with the intent to authenticate it as an act or agreement of the person identifying it."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1386 (7th ed. 1999).
493. See U.C.I.T.A. § 102(55) (2001) ("[Information that is inscribed on a tangible me-
dium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in a perceivable
form.").
494. See id. § 102(6) ("[T]o sign; or with the intent to sign a record, otherwise to execute
or adopt an electronic symbol, sound, message, or process referring to, attached to, in-
cluded in, or logically associated or linked with that record.").
495. See Raymond T. Nimmer, International Information Transactions: An Essay on
Law in an Information Society, 26 BROOM J. INT'L L. 5, 8 (2000).
496. See U.C.I.T.A. § 102(4) (2001) ("[Ihe bargain of the parties in fact as found in
their language or by implication from other circumstances, including course of perform-
ance course of dealing and usage of trade as provided in this [act].").
497. Id. § 210.
498. See id. § 102(6).
499. See id. § 101.
500. See id.
501. UCITA defines "manifestation of assent" as follows:
(a) A person manifests assent to a record or term if the person, acting with
knowledge of, or having an opportunity to review the record, term or copy of
it:
(1) authenticates the record or term with intent to adopt or accept it; or
(2) intentionally engages in conduct or makes statements with reason to
know that the other party or its electronic agent may infer from the con-
duct or statement that the person assents to the record or term.
(b) An electronic agent manifests assent to a record or term if, after having
an opportunity to review it, the electronic agent:
(1) authenticates the record or term; or
(2) engages in operations that in the circumstances indicate acceptance of
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In itself, manifestation of assent usually does not replace other
forms of agreements, but when the law is unclear regarding an
agreement following the manifestation of assent, rules will pro-
vide evidence of such agreement."0 2
UCITA was intended as a key step toward uniformity in the
courts where electronic commerce is concerned. UCITA, prepared
by NCCUSL, applies specifically to commercial agreements5 3 and
the record or term.
(c) If this [Act] or other law requires assent to a specific term, a manifestation
of assent must relate specifically to the term.
(d) Conduct or operations manifesting assent may be proved in any manner,
including a showing that a person or an electronic agent obtained or used the
information or informational rights and that a procedure existed by which a
person or an electronic agent must have engaged in the conduce or operations
in order to do so. Proof of compliance with subsection (a) (2) is sufficient if
there is conduct that assents and subsequent conduct reaffirms assent by
electronic means.
(e) With respect to an opportunity to review, the following rules apply:
(1) A person has an opportunity to review a record or term only if it is
made available in a manner that ought to call it to the attention of a rea-
sonable person and permit review.
(2) An electronic agent has an opportunity to review a record or term only
if it is made available in manner that would enable a reasonably config-
ured electronic agent to react to the record or term.
(3) If a record or term is available for review only after a person becomes
obligated to pay or begins its performance, the person has an opportunity
to review only if it has a right to a return if it rejects the record. However,
a right to a return is not required if (a) the record proposes a modification
of contact or provides particulars of performance under Section 305; or
(A) the record proposes a modification of contact or provides particu-
lars of performance under Section 305; or
(B) the primary performance is other than delivery or acceptance of a
copy, the agreement is not a mass-market transaction, and the parties
at the time of contracting had reason to know that a record or term
would be presented after performance, use, or access to the information
began.
(4) The right to a return under paragraph (3) may arise by law or by
agreement.
(f) The effect of provisions of this section may be modified by an agreement
setting out standards, applicable to future transactions between the parties.
(g) Providers of online services network access, and telecommunications ser-
vices, or the operators of facilities thereof, do not manifest assent to a con-
tractual relationship simply by their provision of those services to other par-
ties, including, without limitation, transmission, routing, or providing
connections, linking, caching, hosting, information location tools, or storage of
materials, at the request or initiation of a person other than the service pro-
vider.
Id. § 112.
502. See id. § 210.
503. Patrick A. Shah, The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 15
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was designed to: "(1) support and facilitate the realization of the
potential of computer information transactions; (2) clarify the law
governing computer information transactions; (3) enable expand-
ing commercial practice in computer information transactions by
commercial usage and agreement of the parties; (4) promote uni-
formity of the law.... ."o0
UCITA was designed to cover software licenses, programs, and
electronic commerce where computer information is the majority
of the document.05 The contracts covered by UCITA, are consid-
ered valid contracts and are enforceable." 6 However, to bind a
party, UCITA requires that "licensee[s] have an 'opportunity to
review' the terms prior to assenting and also that [they] reaffirm
assent for electronic transactions."5 7
UCITA, for example, contains provisions specifically applicable
to shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements.0 8 The buyer must
know of the possibility of more terms to the agreement, have the
right to return the product at the distributor's cost, and if the
software caused changes in the computer, then compensation
must be given by the distributor.5°9 These qualifications are es-
tablished to attempt to avoid problem areas such as unconscion-
ability and adhesion, yet still allow the contracts to be found
valid.5 10
Unconscionability issues, however, will not be ignored, and
compliance with UCITA's qualifications does not guarantee valid-
ity.511 Shrink-wrap licenses can and will be found unenforceable
and void in certain instances. When this happens, the distributor
is left with very little recourse other than relying on copyright
and intellectual property laws." 2
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 85, 85 (2000).
504. U.C.I.T.A. § 106(a) (2001).
505. Shah, supra note 503, at 85.
506. Id. at 90-91.
507. Id. at 90.
508. U.C.I.T.A. § 209 (2001). Comment 2(a) to section 209 provides additional insight
on this point.
509. See Shah, supra note 503, at 91.
510. U.C.I.TA § 211 (2001).
511. See Shah, supra note 503, at 90-91.
512. Founds, supra note 67, at 101.
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The proposed changes in the UCC and UCITA include chang-
ing the warranties to be more applicable to today's products.513
One of the planned changes is to distinguish between two types of
express warranties, information and informational content. 14
These new express warranties would provide better coverage for
today's technology by applying to programs, databases, and other
technological algorithm processes.
The original implied warranties would remain essentially un-
changed. A third implied warranty, however, would apply to
software development and design contracts.515 The implementa-
tion of these warranties on computer-based products is a way for
the distributor and the consumer to check and balance each
other. The warranty is not effective if the license is not agreed to,
but if it is agreed to, the warranty protects the consumer.516
The continued applicability of UCITA is somewhat in question.
The few states that have adopted UCITA have added extensive
amendments, changing the core of the document." 7 Additionally,
E-SIGN, which specifically references UETA, seems at least to
preliminarily indicate a preference for legislation at the federal
level.1 ' Further, some commentators argue that UCITA conflicts
with federal intellectual property law.519 All of these factors, com-
bined with UCITA's allegiance with the highly controversial
precedent of ProCD, could spell the end of the statute.
C. UETA
UETA52 ° was developed concurrently with UCITA, and in July
of 1999, UETA was approved by NCCUSL and various states be-
gan implementing the legislation.521
513. See Shah, supra note 503, at 94-95; see also Harris, supra note 41, at 387-89;
Kaner, supra note 39, at 484.
514. Shah, supra note 503, at 95.
515. Id. at 96.
516. Id.
517. See Rustad, supra note 43, at 589.
518. See 15 U.S.C. § 7002 (2000).
519. Towle, supra note 39, at 875-76.
520. U.E.T.A. § 5b (Dec. 13, 1999 Draft). Like UCITA, UETA may be found at the offi-
cial Web site of NCCUSL's Uniform Law Commissioners. The site is located at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc-frame.htm (last updated Jan. 11, 2002).
521. Amelia H. Boss, Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, in ECOMMERCE:
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UETA is somewhat broader in scope than UCITA. As one
commentator has noted:
Where the UCITA is limited to commercial licensing, the UETA ap-
plies to many non-commercial signatures and records.
Most prominent among the substantive differences between the
UCITA and the UETA is that the UCITA still includes evidentiary
presumptions for signatures that use reasonable attribution or secu-
rity procedures. Where the UETA has deleted its provisions on the
effect of a security procedure, the UCITA may instead delete the
penalties for mandating unreasonable procedures.
522
UETA applies to electronic transactions. Transactions that are
covered are those that involve an "action or set of actions occur-
ring between two or more persons relating to the conduct of busi-
ness, commercial, or governmental affairs."523
UETA construes an electronic signature to be an "electronic
sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with
a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to
sign the record."5 2' The need for signatures on contracts is three-
fold: (1) to assure the accuracy of information included; (2) to
show that the parties had an opportunity to read the contract;
and (3) to establish an agreement by the parties.525 By allowing
an electronic signature to "stand in" for a written signature, and
subsequently enforcing electronic contracts, people and busi-
nesses can proceed with a certain amount of confidence.526
The validation of electronic signatures will not only be of use in
electronic contracts, but it will also benefit click-wrap licenses.
Presently, click-wrap licenses are acknowledged when the "ac-
cept" button is selected during installation of the software.527 If a
signature replaced the "accept" button, it would make the agree-
ment more likely to be enforced.5 2' As long as the UETA rules are
STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS IN THE DIGrrAL ECONOY 2000, at 391, 393 (PLI Intellectual
Prop. Course, Handbook Series G-588, 2000).
522. Scoville, supra note 53, at 394-95.
523. U.E.T.A. §§ 2(16), 3 (Dec. 13, 1999 Draft).
524. Id. § 2(8).
525. R. David Whitaker, Rules Under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act for an
Electronic Equivalent to a Negotiable Promissory Note, 55 BUS. LAW. 437, 437 n.1 (1999).
526. See Boss, supra note 521, at 397.
527. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
528. See Whitaker, supra note 525, at 447-48.
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adhered to, it appears the use of signatures in licenses would
benefit distributors employing click-wrap licenses.529
UETA is in place to protect parties involved in electronic con-
tracts and to promote their use. 3 ' It is of interest that while de-
leted in the latest version, UETA originally included a so-called
repugnancy clause."' While the clause was included because cer-
tain parties felt that electronic contracts and signatures were not
sufficient for some transactions, 53 2 others felt that its inclusion
would cause uncertainty.533 Because of the repugnancy clause
parties using an electronic contract had to first ensure that their
contract fell within the scope of UETA.
D. E-SIGN
E-SIGN goes far beyond any of the state measures, including
UCITA, UETA, and even the UCC, and affects "services" as well
as "real property," a broad sweep for one statute, which also al-
lows opportunities for judicial activism.5 34 E-SIGN simply pro-
vides that, "with respect to any transactions in or affecting inter-
state or foreign commerce,"5 35 a contract cannot be denied legal
effect because it was executed by an "electronic signature"36 or an
"electronic record,"5 37 or an "electronic agent"53 made the transac-
tion.539
The statute provides that "a State statute, regulation, or other
rule of law may modify, limit, or supersede" this law, only if it is
529. See id.
530. See U.E.T.A. § 6 cmts. 1-2 (Dec. 13, 1999 Draft); Whitaker, supra note 525, at 439.
531. See Scoville, supra note 53, at 389.
532. See id. at 383.
533. Id. at 389 n.205.
534. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001(a), 7006(13) (2000).
535. Id. § 7001(a).
536. Id. § 7006(5) ("The term 'electronic signature' means an electronic sound, symbol,
or process, attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and executed
or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record.").
537. Id. § 7006(4) ("The term 'electronic record' means a contract or other record cre-
ated, generated, sent communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.").
538. Id. § 7006(5) ("The term 'electronic agent' means a computer program or an elec-
tronic or other automated means used independently to initiate an action or respond to
electronic records or performances in whole or in part without review or action by an indi-
vidual at the time or the action or response.").
539. Id. § 7001(a).
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"an enactment or adoption of the Uniform Electronics Transac-
tions Act," as approved by NCCUSL and not inconsistent with E-
SIGN.54° Moreover, E-SIGN preempts Articles 2 and 2A in their
entirety as well as UCC sections 1-107 and 1-206 in every state. 4'
The purpose of E-SIGN is broad. Congress stated that "by re-
moving the uncertainty over the legal effect, validity, or enforce-
ability of electronic signatures and records, electronic commerce
will have the opportunity to reach its full potential."542
With one exception, the legislators were quite careful to avoid
determining what type of "encryption"543 or "signature device""
will be permitted. E-SIGN contains a prohibition against oral
communications qualifying as an "electronic record."545 Beyond
this exception, however, commentators argue that the states
should ultimately determine what kind of signature technology to
approve and accept.546 Thumbprints, simple passwords, pin num-
bers, or encrypted keys are distinct possibilities.4 However,
could a clever hacker simply access this "secret" method and affix
a consumer's signature to an electronic contract not authorized?
"Consumers are left to prove a negative," says Margo Saunders
of the National Consumer Law Center.54 Without a requirement
for a paper signature, hackers could easily forge electronic signa-
tures on anything from online purchases to credit card applica-
tions.549 Thus the states may have a major task in developing fur-
ther protections of users.5
E-SIGN states that a consumer may "consent [ electronically
or confirm [ I his or her consent electronically, in a manner that
540. Id. § 7002(a)(1).
54L Id. § 7003(a)(3).
542. H.R. REP. No. 106-341, pt. 1, at 8 (1999).
543. Scoville, supra note 53, at 350 ("Encryption, specifically, is the process whereby an
algorithm (a series of mathematical processes) is applied to... data, or plain text, produc-
ing the scrambled ciphertext. Through an inverse mathematical process, namely decryp-
tion, the ciphertext may be retransformed into the original plain text.").
544. Id. at 349-50. ("Hardware, software or technology of some kind which authenti-
cates identity and attaches it to information.").
545. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(6) (2000).
546. Scoville, supra note 53, at 409.
547. Alvarez & Clausing, supra note 1.
548. Id.
549. Id. Cf. Scoville, supra note 53, at 357 (noting that paper signature requirements
are often imposed because of concern about authenticity).
550. See Alvarez & Clausing, supra note 1.
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reasonably demonstrates that the consumer can access informa-
tion in the electronic form ... .""' Of course, a consumer could
withdraw her consent if it is received "within a reasonable period
of time."552 What if the recipient of such a "withdrawal" by e-mail
is on vacation and does not open it for two weeks? E-SIGN sug-
gests that he will be bound.553 Query: Does an E-SIGN with-
drawal mean the same as "rejection"55 4 or "revocation of accep-
tance"555 under the common law, or does it constitute a
"counteroffer?"556 With no other federal contract law, will courts
in diversity cases apply the contract law of the state involved or
see this as an opportunity to engage in "judicial legislation"
through interpretation of E-SIGN?
E. The European Union Directive
The United States is not the only nation struggling to make
online transactions safer and more efficient.557 In fact, the Euro-
pean Union is rapidly moving to enact Internet solutions to con-
tracting online.5 ' The speed at which the European Union has
engaged and come to tentative resolution regarding electronic
commerce problems has caused some American commentators to
551. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1)(C)(ii) (2000).
552. Id. § 7001(c)(4).
553. See id.
554. Section 38 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines "Rejection" as follows:
"(1) An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated by his rejection of the offer, unless the
offeror has manifested a contrary intention. (2) A manifestation of intention not to accept
an offer is a rejection unless the offeree manifests an intention to take it under further ad-
visement." RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 38.
555. Section 53 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that "Acceptance by
Performance" and "Manifestation of Intention Not to Accept" are
(2) the rendering of a performance does not constitute an acceptance if within
a reasonable time the offeree exercises reasonable diligence to notify the of-
feror of non-acceptance. (3) Where an offer of a promise invites acceptance by
performance and does not invite a promissory acceptance, the rendering of
the invited performance does not constitute acceptance if before the offeror
performs his promise the offeree manifests an intention not to accept.
Id. § 53.
556. Section 54 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines counteroffer as fol-
lows: "A reply to an offer which purports to accept it but is conditional on the offeror's as-
sent to terms additional to or different from those offered is not an acceptance but is a
counteroffer." Id. § 54.
557. Towle, supra note 39, at 873-74.
558. Id.
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fear that the European model could become the standard.559 The
goal of the European Union Directive, adopted in May of 1997, is
to ensure that European consumers doing business via the Inter-
net are provided with broad protection.560
Specifically, it is aimed at consumers entering into "distance
contracts" by "'means of communication at a distance.' 56' Con-
sumer is defined as a natural person acting outside his/her trade,
business, or profession.5 62 Distance contracts pertain to contracts
involving goods or services between a buyer and seller under an
organized distance sale plan, where the seller exclusively uses a
"means of communication at a distance" through contract forma-
tion.563 Some of the acceptable "means" of communication used to
form distance contracts are non-contract communications such as
mail, fax, Internetcomputer, radio, telephone, television, and
videotex.564
Recognizing the need to provide legal structure to Internet con-
sumers, the European Directive secured for consumers the right
to the following information prior to entering into a transaction:
the supplier's name and address, the main features of the product
or service including prices and taxes, any added delivery costs,
arrangements for payment and delivery, the right to withdraw
from the contract, and the duration of the offer.565 In addition,
this information must be presented in an appropriate means of
communication, in a comprehensible manner, and in "due re-
gard.., to the principles of good faith in commercial transac-
tions."566
On or before delivery of the product, the supplier has to provide
the buyer with information in writing or another tangible me-
dium regarding rights to withdrawal, any post-sale services and
guarantees, and the conditions for canceling long term con-
559. Nimmer, supra note 50, at 6.
560. Towle, supra note 39, at 874.
561. Id.
562. Id.
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. Council Directive 97/7/EC of 20 May 1997 on the Protection of Consumers in Re-
spect of Distance Contracts, art. 4, § la-i, at http//europa.eu.inteur-lex/en/lif/dat/1997/en
_397L0007.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2002) [hereinafter European Directive].
566. Id. art. 4, § 2.
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tracts.567 In addition, the consumer has the right to withdraw
anytime for any reason within seven days of receiving the product
or confirmation of the order.56 Finally, the supplier has thirty
days to return any previous payments.569
The European Directive also recognized the difference between
ordinary goods and "special" products that can be copied or used
before the withdrawal date."' Thus, books, soft are, audio and
video recordings, records, CD's, and the like, as opposed to con-
ventional goods, can not be returned if they are taken out of their
original wrapping."'
Finally, not all types of contracts are included under the Euro-
pean Directive. 2 Contracts relating to financial services, immov-
able property, and those concluded by means of automatic vend-
ing machines, telecommunications operators via payphones, or at
an auction are all excluded.57
With the European Directive leading the world in Internet le-
gal structure, American scholars and lawmakers fear that the
proposed American legislation will fade away if not passed by the
states in the near future. 74 Therefore, the European Directive
may become the law of the land by default.
V. CONCLUSION
Can you foresee a video teleconference over business negotia-
tions involving parties from several different states adjourning
into a "cybersigning room" offering a "digital handshake system"
that allows people to securely complete their negotiations? If you
believe that is the future-think again: it is the present. The new
E-SIGN gives electronic signatures the legal weight of paper sig-
natures.575
567. See id. art. 5.
568. See id. art. 6.
569. See id. art. 7.
570. Towle, supra note 39, at 874.
571. Id.
572. See European Directive, supra note 565, at art. 3.
573. See id.
574. Towle, supra note 39, at 874-75.
575. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001, 7006, 7021, 7023 (2000).
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Historically, businesses and customers have had to wait sev-
eral days or weeks for paper contracts to be properly executed by
all parties. The new law offers consumers the chance to sign le-
gally enforceable contracts for car loans, health insurance, and
stock accounts over the Internet-around the clock with no time
delay. You can even submit your tax forms without having to also
send the separate paper form bearing your signature.576 Custom-
ers, however, still have some choices-whether to do business
online or on paper.577 And because of political negotiating, insur-
ance and utility companies must still send notices through the
mail.578 Trusts and wills cannot be executed over the Internet,
and products may not be recalled online.57 9 To make you feel quite
safe, mortgages must also be foreclosed with a paper trail.50
While the statute does not specifically identify what a digital
signature will look like, companies and consumers could fashion
various remedies. Three examples are:
(1) A simple password entered into a form on a Web page. In this
case the Web site would have to issue the password, or confirm that
it belongs to a certain person; (2) Hardware like thumbprint-
scanning devices or electronic pads and styluses that plug into per-
sonal computes. The information would be sent over the Internet to a
business, which would then keep it on file as proof of authenticity;
(3) Third-party services that use software to generate encrypted
keys-essentially personalized scrambled code tied to one party-
that can be attached to any e-mail message or tamper-proof elec-
tronic documents. The third party holds the identity of the two par-
ties and can then use the encryption software to ensure that only the
two parties involved in a contract can obtain and sign the document,
whether on a Web page or in e-mail.
581
With the technological advances that have been made in the
last ten years, there is the probability that newer and better
processes and materials will be found. To protect those that in-
vent, distribute, or purchase such products, the legal community
will have to be prepared to recognize the changes taking place
and how they will affect the laws. As computing environments
576. Id. § 7004(a)-(c).
577. See id. § 7004.
578. Id. § 7003(a)-(b).
579. Id.
580. Id.
581. Alvarez & Clausing, supra note 1, at B14.
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change and more people become computer friendly, there is a de-
sire for simpler ways of doing things. People do not want to have
to go somewhere to sign a contract when they could just do it
online.
On the other hand, with secured transactions, there is always a
fear that someone could access the information and perhaps sign
in place of someone else.582 Contract law has made giant leaps in
countering would-be fraudulent activity by encoding messages
and transactions, and UETA has provided a good beginning base
for these issues that will improve as technology does.
As people get to know today's technologies better, more time
and money will be invested into products that will enhance or re-
place the technology already available. In order to protect con-
sumers, many companies are providing longer and improved war-
ranty coverage. This helps allocate the risk of loss for customers
who purchase expensive equipment or programs and makes them
more willing to spend the money necessary to acquire it.583
Laws, as they have in the past, will change in order to be appli-
cable in the new environment. New contractual terms and licens-
ing agreements will have to be established and the laws may be
reinterpreted. The trend over the last century was an increase in
the number of people applying for copyright, patent, and trade-
mark protections, and we can expect the same in the future." It
is anticipated, however, that there will be even more people seek-
ing protection from contract and license agreements. The laws
will be interpreted in new ways and may be abandoned or rewrit-
ten to suit the changing economy. It is true in nature and true in
the law: only the strong and adaptable will survive.
582. See generally Craig W. Harding, Selected Issues in Electronic Commerce: New
Technologies and Legal Paradigms, in DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET: THE LAW OF
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, at 7 (Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course,
Handbook Series G-491, 1997).
583. See Fred M. Greguras, 1998 Trends in Software Licensing and Legal Protection for
Software, at httpJ/www.oikoumene.com/softwr_licnsetrnds98.html (June 4, 1998).
584. See id.
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